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INTRODUCTION

o if u

Aristotle's conception of

,

as lie sets it forth in his Nicomachean Ethics ,
Book 4- chapter 3» has had from the earliest com
mentators up to the present a number of significantly different interpretations.
This is initially surprising.

4
When

we study this chapter, we find that Aristotle
describes the megalopsychos in vivid terms.

He

comes alive as a robust, dynamic human being,
perhaps, even, Aristotle's conception of the
ideal man.

We can almost feel his breath, hear

his deep voice, see the unhurried movement of his
body.
^

/
Hereafter referred to as 4-.3. UZVxSQtyuxKK
I shall transliterate to "megalopsychia," under
stood literally as "greatness of soul." ucQcxSoyoxoS
I shall transliterate to "megalopsychos," under
stood literally as "great of soul." I shall use
"megalopsychos" primarily to designate "the man
who is great of soul," although I shall also use
it as a predicate adjective as in "The man is
megalopsychos," that is, "The man is great of
soul." The context will make my usage clear.
When necessary to distinguish a citation of one
version of Aristotle's ethics from the other

1

2

But the portrait is deceptively simple.
The concrete descriptions are straightforward,
but which of them, if any, does Aristotle regard
as fundamental?

By which characteristic does

he intend to capture the essence of the megalo
psychos, marking him off from all men of lesser
stature?

What is that characteristic which,

once named, explains all the others?
''Megalopsychia seems to be concerned with
great things," Aristotle tells us.

"What sort of

great things, is the first question we must try
to answer."

A

Exactly.

But nov/here does

Aristotle give an exact answer.
of 4-.3 he says:

At the opening

fxCXUXolp v x o s

ciyxi

o (ue{rcK(Xcuy d u r o i i &£ t w V oc£ios oJVi "Now the
version, I shall use the customary EN for the
Nicomachean, EE for the Eudemian.
1
W. D. Ross, gen. ed., The Works of
Aristotle Translated into English, 12" vo'ls.
(London:"" Oxford University Press, 1910-52),
EN 1123a 33-354-. All subsequent references to
"Aristotle's writing will be to the Oxford edition,
unless otherwise indicated. The only difference
will be that ^ use the transliterations, "meg
alopsychia" and "megalopsychos." For other works
cited in this study I shall also, when applic
able, use these transliterations.

5

man is thought to be megalopsychos who thinks
himself worthy of great things, being worthy of
them."

At the end of 4.3 b.e concludes:

"Megalopsychia, then, is concerned with honor

o

on the grand scale, as has been said."1

In between, Aristotle elaborates at
a number of places the concern of the megalo
psychos. with honor.^

This has led commentators

to conclude that the megalopsychos is basically
concerned with externally bestowed honor, a
conclusion that has three versions:

a) the

megalopsychos is basically concerned with ex
ternal honor'

and this clearly and simply is that

of which he thinks himself worthy, b) the meg
alopsychos is basically concerned with external
honor, and thus with the great moral action by
which he will earn that honor, c) the megalo
psychos is basically concerned with external
11123b 1.

^1125a 35-

^1123b 15-23, 35? 1124a 4-15, 16-19,
22-27; 1124b 7, 23-25; 1125a 29-35.

honor and thus with living that type of life
which to Aristotle is most worthy of honor:

the

life of theoria.
All three interpretations agree that
megalopsychia is concerned basically with
externally bestowed honor.

However, there exists

a basic divergence over whether the megalopsychos
is a man of moral action or a man of contem
plation.

Using Aristotle's terms, there is a

basic divergence over whether the megalopsychos
is a practikos or a theoretikos.
My thesis is that Aristotle describes
the megalopsychos as a man basically concerned
with enhancing the nobility of his soul through
a life of moral action.

This means that the

megalopsychos is: a) a practikos and b) that he
is basically concerned— not with externally
bestowed honor— but with his internal sense of
honor.
The crucial point is that the megalo
psychos is primarily concerned with his inner
nobility, not with externally bestowed honor.
Surface appearances seem to contradict this;

5

they seem to depict a man basically concerned
with faiiie, or at least with his good reputation.
Thus commentators are likely to see the megalo*

psychos as a "stuffed shirt,"

p

as "intolerable,"

or as a "prig with the conceit and bad manners
7.

of a prig."^

For Ross the picture as a whole is

an "nnpleasing one; it is an anticipation of
the Stoic sage without his self-abasement before
the ideal of duty.'1*1’
There are exceptions, of course.

Grant,

for instance, states that "nothing can be more
subtle or felicitous than many of [Aristotle's]

York:

*V. T. Jones, The Classical Mind (New
Harcourt, Brace~1£~World, 19$9), "p• 272.
p

Jo A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean
Ethics« 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892),
1: 55$""(hereafter cited as Stewart, Notes).
^An unnamed Oxford lecturer cited by
W. F. R. Kardie, Aristotle1s Ethical Theory
(London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1958), p.
119.

lL
(London:

Sir David Ross, Aristotle, rev. 5th ed.
Methuen & Co., 19^9), p.’ 208.
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observations" on megalopsychia.

But on the

whole 4.2 has received a bad press, so much so that
one commentator remarks:

"For anything that

could properly be called a rigorous defense— or
even a sympathetic explication, I have looked
m

vain."m 2
*

Ross inadvertently accounts for at
least part of this bad press.

There is indeed

no "self-abasement before the ideal of duty" in
Aristotle's megalopsychos.

On the contrary,

self-abasement is for Aristotle one of the vices
opposed to megalopsychia, namely, micropsychia
or smallness ,of soul.

Russell looks at 4.3

and "shudders to think what a vain man would be
like,"^ implying that Aristotle is portraying
a self-inflated man.
estimate.

Others share Russell's

The concern of the megalopsychos "with

Sir Alexander Grant, The Ethics of
Aristotle, 2 vols., 4th ed. (London: n.p.,
T884‘),"2":72.
p
F. A. Seddon, Jr., "Megalopsychia: A
Suggestion," The Personalist, LVI 1 (Winter 1975)*
p. 31 (hereafter cited as Seddon, "A Suggestion";.
^Bertrand Russell, History of Western
Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975)»
p. 193.

his owi greatness,” says one, "has something
overweening about it for, aiming at divine honors,

y]

he is divinely jealous of his superiority.”

Another commentator expresses a similar
idea.

As she puts it, the megalopsychos

... acts honorably and nobly ... not in
order that the good may be affirmed, but
in order that he may maintain unimpaired
his superiority over his f e l l o w m e n ; h e
is the ... [man} ... who is always one up
on his fellowmen, who knows all the
ploys and gambits for keeping himself
securely, unassailably, in this agree
able position of superiority.2
“Aristotle does not see fair,” claims
another.

"The dice are loaded in favour of

H. V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism. A Study .of the Commentary by Thomas
Aquinas on the Ificomachean Ethics (Uhicago:
\Jniversity of Chicago Press ,'"1$';*?), pp. 14-014-1.
p

Dorothea Krook, Three Traditions of
Moral Thought (Cambridge: n.p., 19591, p. 5^ •
Cited by Walter J. Bartling, "Megalopsychia:
An Interpretation of Aristotle's Ethical
Ideal" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University, 1963), p. 57 (hereafter cited as
Bartling, "Megalopsychia").

magnanimous virtue , but the implications of
magnanimous evil are also there.”

He then goes

on to call the megalopsychos a "strange
incubus."

a

Such evaluations as these, however, see
less than "fair."

They assume that the megalo

psychos is primarily concerned with fame, and
thus they all too easily conflate megalopsychia
and self-inflation.^

Aristotle, however, clearly

contrasts them and any suggestion that he con
flates them would require argument.

Instead,

the conflation is apparently inferred from the

A

Robert Payne, Hubris: A Study of
Pride (New York: Harper & Brother s , Harper
Torchbooks, 1960), p. 55* Rev. ed. of The
Wanton Nymph: A Study of Pride (London:
WilTiam Heinemann, 195^7^
p

I use "self-inflation" rather than
the often-used "vanity" to render the Greek
concept t<x.Q\!oS9 "Vanity" often denotes the
attempt to gain the esteem of other people
for one's physical appearance, and this use
apoears at the end of A.5 at 1125a $0. But
this is only one denotation of chaunos for
Aristotle. Among others that are plain in
A.5, it would also encompass his reference
to hubris at 112Aa 28. Therefore a wider
expression is needed.
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assumption that the megalopsychos is primarily
concerned with fame.

I intend to challenge

this assumption in what follows.
Other commentators have adopted a softer
line.

They find Aristotle's portrait of the

megalopsychos unappealing* but rather than con
demn it outright, they prefer to think that
Aristotle was not being serious.

For one comment-

y\

ator 4-.3 "seems a caricature," for another
O
Aristotle is being humorous, for another
satirical.^

Burnet sees "much quiet humor" and

claims that the picture is "surely half-ironical."^
But these judgments, as well as the hostile ones,
are understandable only on the assumption that
Aristotle is giving us a man basically con^G. E. G. Mure, Aristotle (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 155. Cited
by Seddon, "A Suggestion," p. 31.
^H. H. Joachim, Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951)«
p T T ^ T "Cltid by Seddon, p. 31.
^J. H. Eandall, Jr., Aristotle (New York:
Columbia University Press, 19C0), p.' 24-9.
4J . Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle
(London: n.p., 1900) , p..’179.

cerned v/itb. externally bestowed honor.

On this

assumptionv we have seen, Aristotle's megalo
psychos is either monstrous or preposterous.
These estimates are equally implausible.

And

the assumption they rest on, I shall argue,
is also implausible.
The conflation of megalopsychia and self
inflation is not the only one to which megalo
psychia falls victim.

It is also conflated with

A
Aristotle's virtue of universal justice.
"This form of justice," Aristotle tells us, "is
' complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it
is the actual exercise of complete virtue.

It

is complete because he who possesses it can
exercise his virtue not only in himself but

o

toward his neighbor also.1'** And he adds that

y\

This virtue is distinct from "particular"
justice, to be discussed below in chapter 1. The
"universal"-"particular" terminology I adopt from
Ross, Aristotle, p. 209.

2m 5.1 1129b 30-1150a 1.

11

11justice in this sense, then* is not part of
virtue but virtue entire.11
Jaeger refers to megalopsychia in the
same terms.

"It is initially surprising,” he

states in one of his works, ’’for us to find
that megalopsychia is considered as a virtue.
And it is also notable that Aristotle does not
believe it to be an independent virtue like
the others, but one which presupposes them and
p

is ’in a way an ornament to them.” '
statement seems misplaced.

Now this

Commentators such

as Ross inform us that ”in later Greek, justice
tends to be identical with the whole of
righteousness."^

Jaeger's statement, then, might

fipply "to universal justice, but not to megalo
psychia.
As if to fend off Jaeger in advance,
Aristotle says that the megalopsychos "is an
11130a 9p

Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of
Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert'Uighet, 2d ed.
vols. (New fork: Oxford University Press, 194-344-), 1:62 (hereafter cited as Jaeger, Paideia).
^Aristotle, p. 209.

12

extreme in respect of the greatness of his
claims, but a mean in respect of the rightness
of them; for he claims what is in accordance
with his merits, while the others

[the self-

inflated and the micronsychoi] go to excess or
1
fall short."
Clearly Aristotle sees the meg
alopsychos as striking a mean between two ex
tremes, a basic aspect of any virtue for
Aristotle.
In his earlier Eudemian Ethics Aristotle
likewise believed that megalopsychia is an
independent virtue:

"Each of the virtues seems

to make men megalopsychos in regard to the things
with which that virtue is concerned .... But
nevertheless there is a single virtue of megalo
psychia side by side with the other virtues, so
that the possessor of this virtue must be termed
megalopsychos in a special sense."

p

Contrary to Jaeger, then, Aristotle did
'M^b

3-13.

See also 1125a 17-34.

^3*5 1232b 24-27. Trans. H. Racfchara,
Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1971)*
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"believe megalopsychia to he 1,an independent
virtue like the others.11 Of course, it remains
to he seen whether he is justified in his
belief.

And to see that he is, we first must

recognize that for Aristotle the megalopsychos
is a man whose basic concern is to enhance the
nobility of his soul through a life of moral
action.

CHAPTER I
ARISTOTLE'S MEGALOPSYCHOS
HIS BASIC CONCERN
Aristotle introduces the megalopsychos
as a man who "thinks himself worthy of great
things, being worthy of them."
Clearly implied is that the megalopsychos is a morally responsible agent, both in
his own view and in Aristotle's.

We need to

pause on this since it involves a theory of
agency not generally held today.
When Aristotle enunciates his theory of
responsibility in EFT 3 .5 , he tells us that "if ...
we cannot refer actions to moving principles
other than those in ourselves, the acts whose
moving principles are in us must themselves also
be in our power and voluntary."

*

Row this idea

of moving principles that are in us and within
our voluntary power is part of a conception of
causality that includes the possibility of
11113b 19-21.

See also 1112a 30, b 32.

14
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self-moving entities.

Aristotle extensively

analyzes self-motion and the physical basis
for it elsewhere.

A

All we need to observe here

is that Aristotle bases his ethics of personal
responsibility on that conception.

Immediately

after his statement about moving principles
that are in us, he makes the connection:
Witness seems to be borne to this both
by individuals in their private capacity
and legislators themselves; for these
punish and take vengeance on those who do
wicked acts (unless they have acted under
compulsion or as a result of ignorance
for which they are not themselves respon
sible) , while they honor those who do noble
acts, as though they meant to encourage the
latter and deter the former .... Indeed,
we punish a man for his very ignorance, if
he is thought responsible for the ignorance,
as when penalities are doubled in the case
of drunkenness; for the moving principle
is in the man himself, since he had the
power of not getting drunk and his getting
drunk was the cause of his ignorance. And
we punish those who are ignorant of any
thing in the laws that they ought to know
and that is not difficult, and so too in
the case of anything else that they are
thought to be ignorant of through careA

Most notably in Physics 8.5* On the
Soul 3.10, and On the Motion of Animals. "TPo
my knowledge there has been no sustained analysis
of Aristotle's conception of self-motion. Some
of its enormous complexities are spelled out by
David Furley in a brief paper entitled “SelfMovers, " Symposium Aristotelicum. 1975*
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lessness; v;e assume that it is in their
power not to be ignorant, since they have
the power of taking care,”
Thus for Aristotle a man clearly is
responsible for the type of character he develops.
Even those who take no care about the kind of
person they become are still responsible for
becoming men of that kind.
Men make themselves responsible for being
unjust or self-indulgent, in the one case
by cheating and in the other by spending
their time in drinking bouts and the like;
for it is activities exercised on particular
objects that make the corresponding character.
This is plain from the case of people
training for any contest or action; they
practice the activity the whole time. Now
not to know that it is from the exercise of
activities on particular objects that
states of character are produced is the
mark of a thoroughly senseless p e r s o n . 2
Aristotle's theory of moral responsib
ility is implied in everything he says about the
megalopsychos.

This becomes especially sig

nificant since I am arguing the thesis that
Aristotle's megalopsychos is a man basically
concerned to enhance the nobility of his soul
11113b 22-26, b 30-1114a ?
21114a 4-11.

17

through a life of moral action.

Indeed,

almost all descriptions of him in 4.3 indicate
that he is a man practicing moral virtues else
where treated in the Nicomachean Ethics.

Let

us explore this.
In his first concrete description of
the megalopsychos, Aristotle tells us that "it
would be most unbecoming for the megalopsychos
to fly from danger, swinging his arms by his
sides."
He is obviously alluding to the virtue
? .
/
of
6 P€/c6 courage. In 5»1 he informs us that
"the law bids us do ... the acts of a brave man
(e.g. not to 'desert our post nor take to flight
nor throw away our arms)." " In 5.2 he charac
terizes the courageous man as one who stands
by his comrades;in battle.^

Aristotle neatly

implies that all such manifestations of courage
are lacking in any man who swings his arms by his
side to escape danger.

Such a man is not meg

alopsychos.
11123b 32.
^1129b 19-20. Unless otherwise indicated,
all citations are from the Nicomachean Ethics.

^1130a 30.
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He cautions, however, that the megalo
psychos "does not m m

into trifling dangers,

nor is he fond of danger, because he honors
few things."

This means the megalopsychos is

not guilty of recklessness, the vice opposed to
2
courage by excess of confidence.
He will,
however, "face great dangers, and when he is in
danger he is unsparing of his life, knowing that
there are conditions on which life is not worth
having."^

In 9.8 Aristotle indicates that such

conditions are those that would leave one's
friends or country at the mercy of an enemy.
Faced with such conditions the megalopsychos,
as a good man, would be ready to fight to ‘'the
4
death.
As Aristotle puts it in 3-7, he is
"as dauntless as man may be."^
With his courage, the megalopsychos

.

simultaneously exhibits the virtue of TTP^oT^
good temper.

He is clearly not guilty of

^1124b 72See 3.7, esp. 1115b 28-1116a 10.

^1124b 8-9-

^1169a 19.

51115b 11.

apathy* the vice opposed to good temper by
deficiency of spirit,

The apathetic person is

one who is not pained by things, who is not likely
to defend himself, and who slavishly endures
»i
insult to himself and to his friends.
One
does not find these qualities in the "dauntless"
man.
Nor does the megalopsychos err by excess
of spirit.

He is neither vindictive nor mindful

of petty wrongs.

It is not his part "to have a

long memory, especially for wrongs," says
Aristotle in 4-.3 , "but rather to overlook them."

p

In 4.5 this is a marlc of the good-tempered man,
the man who "is not revengeful, but rather
tends to make allowances."^

Thus we are not sur

prised that the megalopsychos is neither an evil
speaker (not even about his enemies), nor a
gossip, "for he will speak neither about himself
nor about another, since he cares not to be
4
praised nor for others to be blamed."
These
14.5 1126a $-8.
^1126a 2.

21125a 4-5.
S i 25a 5-6, 8.

20

are marks of the good-tempered man, the man
Aristotle defines in 4.5 as one “who is angry
at the right things and with the right people,
and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and

A

as long as he ought.”

By good temper, the megalopsychos also
exhibits

friendliness, the virtue of 4.6

that involves putting up with and resenting the
right things and in the right way.

p

Friend

liness, Aristotle says, also involves a more
general and positive attitude:

the rendering

to each person or class of people what is be
fitting.^

The megalopsychos manifests this

attitude in being "dignified toward people who
enjoy high position, but unassuming toward
those of the middle class."^

Toward the weak

the megalopsychos practices the virtue of
generosity.

He is the sort of

man, Aristotle points out, who will give help
readily, asking nothing for himself or, if he
11125b 52-33.

24.6 1126b 18-19.

^1124b 19-22.

^1124b 19.

21

does receive a "benefit, he will confer greater
benefits in return.
He is ’’unable to make his life revolve
round another, unless it be a friend, for this
is slavish, and for this reason all flatterers
are servile, and people lacking in self-respect
are flatterers."
states in

p

These people, Aristotle

are dishonest because they place

more importance on what people will think than
on the truth.^

But Aristotle emphasizes the

the truthfulness of the megalo
psychos.

He "despises justly (since he thinks

truly) .... He [isj also open in his hate and
in his love (for to conceal one’s feelings, i.e.
to care less for truth than for what people will
think, is a coward’s part), and he is con
temptuous, and ... given to telling the truth,
except when he speaks in irony to the vulgar."
Aristotle has already alluded to truthfulness
11124b 10-12, 18.
*"1124b 54-1125a 2.

^1124b 28.

^1124b 6, 27-51.

It

when he introduces the megalopsychos as the man
11who thinks himself worthy of great things,
being worthy of them.”

In 4-.7 Aristotle

describes trutlifxilness as the state of char
acter of one v/ho "calls a thing by its own
name .... owning to what he has, and neither
more nor less.

This is an application of his

general theory of truth as found in Metaphysics
Gamma:

"To say of what is that it is, and of
p
what is not that it is not, is true."
It also accords with Aristotle's treat
ment of S/koitocriA/TJ » justice, in M

5.^

In 5.2

and 5*3 lie treats justice as the distribution of
honor and wealth among the citizens in proportion
to their merit, estimated on the standard of
virtue.

Justice in this sense is manifest in

the megalopsychos's concern with honor.

"He

claims what is in accordance with his merits,"
says Aristotle, "while the others go to excess or
fall s h o r t . A n d

"even apart from argument

1112?a 24— 25*

21011b 27*

^1 am dealing with "particular" justice
now*
^1123b 14-.

it is with honor that megalopsychoi appear to
be concerned, for it is honor that they chiefly
claim, but in accordance with their deserts.”
Thus the megalopsychos will "irtterly despise”
o
dishonor, "since in his case it cannot be just.”
Aristotle succinctly captures the
megalopsychos's attitude toward honor, when he
says:

"Honors and dishonors .... are the objects

with respect to which the megalopsychos is as he
should be."^

This is the virtue of right am

bition, the state of character, says Aristotle
in 4.4, of one who desires and aims at honor in
Zl

the right way and from the right sources.
megalopsychos is sxich a person.

The

He does not seek

honor from upper class status, power, or wealth.
Hor will he seek honor from insincere people or
on trifling grounds.

On the contrary, Aristotle

tells us, "it is characteristic of the megalo
psychos not to aim at the things commonly held in
honor, or the things in which others excel, to
11123b 22-23.
51123b 22.

^1124a 12.
41125b 8-9.

24

delay and to hold back except where great honor
or a great work is at stake, and to be a man of

A

few deeds, but of great and notable ones.*1

Thus far we have seen the megalopsychos
practicing seven moral virtues:

courage, good

temper, friendliness, generosity, truthfulness,
justice, and right ambition.

He emerges as a

robust, complex, colorful human being, a man
who is ready to die for his country or friend,
yet easily overlooks petty offenses; a man who
is open in his hate and in his love, yet is not
an evil-speaker; a man who is quick to give him
self credit for noble works, yet is unassuming
toward humble people.

Yet with all his facets,

the megalopsychos is a completely integrated per
son, devoid of conflicting impulses.

The various

parts of his soul are in harmony.
The three remaining moral virtues of
the Nicomachean Ethics, magnificence, ready wit,
and temperance, are not as clearly manifested by
1124a 27-b 26 passim. I substitute
"to delay," which is the literal rendering of
the Greek, in place of the liberal, and negative,
"to be sluggish" of the Oxford translation.
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the megalopsychos.

However, when Aristotle

asks early in A.5 to what end the megalopsychos
would do base or disgraceful acts, he probably
has (tto{ppocriJ/'t] , temperence, in mind.

Surely

"base acts" include gluttony, drunkenness, and
sexual excesses— all of which are the subject of
p
Aristotle's discourse on temperance in 3.10.
And in 4-.8 Aristotle regards being witty,

•>
€UTe#r(r€\oh as a special case of being friendly,
so we may presume that the megalopsychos's
friendliness involves wittiness as well.^
The only moral qualities of the
Nicomachean Ethics really missing from Aristotle's
account of the megalopsychos are the qualities
of the man ready to spend large sums fittingly,
s
the magnificent man of 4.2, the //e£<x/\o7TiP€F?l 3".
The nearest Aristotle comes to endowing the
megalopsychos with the qualities of the mag
nificent man is in pointing out that "he is one
to possess beautiful and profitless things
rather than profitable and useful ones."**’
^1123b 32.

^1128b 7*

2Esp. 1118a 32.

^1125a 12.
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But this is meant to illustrate the selfsufficiency of the megalopsychos.

"This is more

proper," Aristotle continues, "to a character
that sxaffices to itself."

As such, the passage

is not really an allusion to the magnificent man.
In fact quite the contrary would seem to be the
case.

For one thing, the practice of magnificence

depends on the possession of great wealth.

For

another, even a person of modest means, or less,
might possess "beautiful and profitless things."
The absence of magnificence is significant,
not only because it is the only moral virtue
whose qualities are missing in 4.3, but because
Aristotle insists that the megalopsychos has
achieved greatness in all the virtues.

But here

we need to remember Aristotle's later admonition
in 10.8 that "we must not think that the man who
is to be happy will need many things .... Even
with moderate advantages one can act virtuously ....
and it is enough that we should have so much as
that, for the life of the man who is active in
accordance with virtue will be happy."
11179a 1-2, 5-9, 12.

A

No
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doubt, then, Aristotle intends his lecture on
magnificence solely for those like his student
Alexander who have the means to practice it.
The other virtues by contrast do not presuppose
wealth; they are intended for everyone.

As

Aristotle says in 4-.3* "those who without virtue
have such goods

[as upper class status, power,

and wealthj are neither justified in making
great claims nor entitled to the name of megalopsychos, for these things imply perfect virtue."
♦♦ice#***#***##**###**
Aristotle leaves no doubt, therefore, that
the megalopsychos is a man who exemplifies the
moral virtues of his Nicomachean Ethics.

In

deed, as demonstrated, nearly all his descriptions
p
point to this.
But the key question remains:
What is this man's basic concern?

Whatever it

is we should expect it to be a great one.
Aristotle alerts us to this when he begins 4-.3
by saying that "megalopsychia seems even from
11124a 27-28.
2
To my knowledge, the above is the first
detailed demonstration of this.

its name to be concerned with great things."
He concludes 4.3 by saying that "megalopsychia,
then, is concerned with honor on the grand scale,
as has been said."

We seem, then, to have good

reason to conclude that honor, externally
bestowed, is the basic concern of 4.3, and
hence of the megalopsychos himself.
There are problems with such a con
clusion however.

oi/V-c
cjs

Most notable is the fact that

ITee) Tif/'nv ou'rcos € x e i,

(((/f/ ifo'/ oV

, "indeed, not even honor does

he

[the megalopsychos] hold as being the
/
greatest thing."
He will be f(€~r^{(/JS
C
/
7}0~@ 7l g~£.~T'cK I , "moderately pleased," at
p
"great honors conferred by good men," but

this we would expect from a man who practices
the virtue of right ambition.

And if receiving

such honors were a basic concern, we would
expect him to be more than just "moderately
pleased."

As Grant notes, Aristotle ostensibly

"fixes external honor as the object with which

'I

'1124a 16.

^1124a 5-6o

My translation.
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megalopsychia deals, "but then afterwards
it above all external honor."

sets

A

Because the megalopsychos possesses
"a character that suffices to itself,"
Aristotle has told us, he is "one who will
possess beautiful and profitless things rather
than profitable and useful ones."

This is the

quality of the man who asks for nothing or
scarcely anything, but gives help readily.
This is the quality of the man who does not
"aim at the things commonly held in honor, or
the things in which others excel," the man who
cares not to-be praised, who is "unable to make
his life revolve round another, unless it be a
friend, for this is slavish."

This is the man

who can regard the honor his fellow man gives
him as a definite and valid good, but not enough
to be a basic concern.

is too self-sufficient

to hold any external good as a very great thing,
"not even honor" which is the greatest of such
goods.
^Ethics of Aristotle, 1:74-.
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Jaeger, tracing the evolution of the
concept of honor in Greek culture, writes that
"the Homeric man estimated his own worth ex
clusively by the standards of the society to
which he belonged.
class:

He was a creature of his

he measured his own arete^by the opinion

which others held of him .... Homer and the
aristocracy of his time believed that the denial
of honor due was the greatest of human tragedies."
But later philosophy, Jaeger tells us, "bade
man obey an inner standard:

it taught him to

regard honor as the external image of his own
inner v a l u e r e f l e c t e d in the criticism of his
fellows."^
It is not that the earlier attitude
toward honor was non-existent in the fourth
century B.C.

Early in the Hicomachean Ethics

Aristotle observes that "men seem to pursue
honor in order that they may be assured of their
goodness."

But this is not Aristotle’s view;

rather he bids man to regard honor as the "ex
ternal image of his inner value."
1Paideia. 1:9.

Megalopsychia

21.5 1095b 27-
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is impossible, he tells us, without kalokagathia,
a concept best rendered by "moral nobility,”
"noble goodness,” or "honorable goodness."
Thus, when the megalopsychos accepts honor, it
is for a goodness and self-worth already
achieved; it would be uncharacteristic of him
to seek a sense of self-worth from external
honor.

This would constitute an inversion.

As Aristotle remarks in his Politics
does not "acquire or preserve virtue by the
help of external goods

[such as honor], but
2
external goods by the help of virtue.
The fact that the megalopsychos

possesses kalokagathia elucidates two other
wise conflicting claims of Aristotle in 4.5:
a) "it is especially with honors and dishonors ...
that the megalopsychos is concerned,"'* and
b) "not even honor does he hold as being the
greatest thing."

The first refers to the

^1124a 5« "Moral nobility" is H.
Rackham’s rendering in his translation of the
Nicomachean Ethics for the Loeb Classical Library.
21$25b 1.
^1 substitute "especially" for the Oxford
"chiefly," as the better rendering of

32

megalopsychos1s proper and specific concern
with the greatest of external goods, honor.

The

second tells us that, for the megalopsychos,
honor is not the greatest of goods in general.
The "especial" concern of the megalopsychos with
external honor is simply that it not be given
too much importance.

I have found this no

where better expressed than in the following:
... Megalopsychia can scarcely be said to
be concerned with honor at all, still less
with the other external goods. Why, then,
does Aristotle begin by suggesting that it
is? The megalopsychos is concerned with
external goods only in so far as he has a
right attitude towards them; and this is
surely only a consequence of his megalo
psychia,. not megalopsychia itself. That
is, his lack of concern with external
goods stems from his awareness of the superior
value of his own goodness; and it is that
awareness, not his attitude towards other
goods as such, which makes him megalo
psychos. '
If, then, the megalopsychos is not
basically concerned with the greatest of ex
ternal goods, honor, with what is he basically
concerned?

How are we to fill the gap left by

Aristotle's claim that "not even honor does he
hold as being the greatest thing"?

Granted

1 C' . J . Howe, The Eudemian and Hicomachean
Ethics: A Study in the development of Aristotle's
Thought (n„p.: The Cambridge Philological Society,
'V97't5 p . 50 (hereafter cited as Eowe, Development
of Aristotle *s Thought)•

[
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that h e ’’thinks himself worthy of great things,
"being worthy of them,” what great things?
A clue to Aristotle's answer can be
seen at the end of 4.3 where he sneaks of those
who are small of soul.

"Each class of people

aims at what corresponds to its worth," he
says, and the basic failure of those who are
micropsychos is that they "stand back even from
noble actions and undertakings deeming them
selves unworthy, and from external goods no
'I
less."
Y/hat this implies is that the "great
things" at the beginning of 4-.3 refers to great
actions.

We -can infer the same from Aristotle's

criticism of the self-inflated man.

They are

"fools and ignorant of themselves," Aristotle
says, "and that manifestly, for, not being worthy
of them, they attempt honorable undertakings,
p
and then are found out."
That the good man concerns himself with
noble undertakings is Aristotle's emphasis
throughout the Njcomachean Ethics.

He

repeatedly stresses that the end of virtue is

1112,6a 26-27.

21125a 28-29.

not external honor, but the good and the noble.

1

For no one is this more true than for the per
son great in all the virtues, the megalopsychos.
Thus, as a courageous man, Aristotle indicates
in 3-7, the megalopsychos would face fearful
things "as he ought and as the rule directs, for
the sake of the noble,To 0
is the end of virtue."

£v'CA'<X» for this

Later, in 4.1, Aristotle

repeats that "virtuous actions are noble and
done for the sake of the noble."

In 9.8, he

identifies the good man as one who "chooses
nobility before all else"; in 1.8 he says that
"the man who- does not rejoice in noble actions is
not even good."

p

The evidence is clear:

The megalo

psychos is a man basically concerned with great
actions oerformed for the sake of the noble.
But my thesis is that he performs these actions
to enhance the nobility of his own soul.

To see

that this further inference is justified we need
^For some examples:
3*7 1115b 14, 22-23,
3.12 1119b 17, 4.1 1120a 23, 4.2 1122b 6.

21169a 33, 1099a 18.

y?

again to go outside of 4.3.
In 2.1 Aristotle tells us that "states

y\

of character arise out of like activities:1'

Noble actions, then, produce nobility of soul,
and great noble action great nobility of soul.
Aristotle makes clear that this is a personal
concern of the megalopsychos in 9-8 in his essay
on the love that a good man has for himself.
He says:
... if a man were always anxious that he
himself, above all things, should act
justly, temperately, or in accordance with
any other of the virtues, and in general
were, always to try to secure for himself
the honorable course, no one will call such
a man a lo.ver of self or blame him.
But such a man would seem more than the
other a lover of self; at all events he
assigns to himself the things that are
noblest and bestT2
It is no surprise, then, that Aristotle
reminds us in 10.7 that "from practical
activities we gain more or less apart from the
action."^
my thesis.

This provides the third element of
The megalopsychos is basically

11103b 22.

See also 3-5 1114a 9-11.

^1168b 25-30.

Emphasis added.

^1177b 2-*3« In contrast to contemplation
which is loved "for its own sake."
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concerned with:

1) great actions, 2) for the

sake of the nobility, 3) of his own soul.

That

is, the megalopsychos is a man whose basic con
cern is to enhance the nobility of his soul
through a life of moral action.

His basic con

cern is not externally bestowed honor, but the
nobility of his soul and the inner sense of honor
which is its concomitant.

This is the person

in Aristotle's theory of friendship who is "his
own best friend" and loves "himself best."
This is the man who takes "delight in his achieve/i
ments" and who knows "no regrets."
Three
times in 4.3' this is the man "to whom nothing
is great."

p

** ** it***************
We now have a vantage point from which
to return to the question:

Is Aristotle

justified in his belief that megalopsychia is
an independent virtue?

Jaeger, we saw, denies

megalopsychia independent status as a virtue
because it presupposes the other virtues and is
19.8 1168b 8-9, 9.4- 1166a 25, 29.
21123b 33, 1125a 3, 15.
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in some sense an ornament to them.

"Megalo-

psyehia seems to be a sort of crown of the vir
tues," -Aristotle affirms, "for it makes them
/]
greater, and it is not found without them.’1
It is necessary, therefore, to reconcile the
above interpretation of the megalopsychos with
this well-known passage.
I want to begin by pointing out that
Aristotle makes two distinct points in the
"crown" statement:

megalopsychia is not found

without the other virtues, and megalopsychia
makes the other virtues greater.
the first is-clear.

The meaning of

We saw that megalopsychia is

not possible without kalokagathia, without great
ness in all the virtues.
But the meaning of the second is ^just as
clear.

Megalopsychia "makes the other virtues

greater" precisely because the primary concern
of the megalopsychos is to enhance the nobility
of his soul through moral action.

Those who

deny the independent status of megalopsychia

'1/H24a 1.
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focus on the crown passage's first point and
neglect the second.

But so narrow a focus is

justified only on the mistaken notion that the
megalopsychos is primarily concerned with ex
ternally bestowed honor.

According to that

notion* megalopsychia is seen as a "virtue"
after the fact; the megalopsychos has achieved
greatness in all the virtues, and now his
primary concern is to get from his fellow man
the honor he deserves.

Not only does this view

do violence to 4-.3» it fails to square with
Aristotle’s general view of the good life.
Happiness, Aristotle repeatedly stresses,
is an activity.

As such, the megalopsychos1s

happiness does not leave him inclined to rest
on his laurels.

Yes, he delights in his achieve

ments and he knows no regrets.

But life for

Aristotle is dynamic, and an individual's life
is always in movement.
no standing still:
falls back.

Spiritually, there is

one either advances or one

Aristotle is quite clear about this.

He tells us that virtues "tend, and by their own
nature, to the doing of the acts by which they
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SI
are produced.1'

And again:

It is more

characteristic of virtue "to do what is noble
p
than not to do what is base."
Aristotle makes
clear, in his many descriptions of the raegalopsychos carrying into action the moral virtues/
of his Nicomachean Ethics« that for no man are
these statements more true.
Ear from undercutting megalopsychia1s
independent status as a virtue, then, the
"crown" passage underscores it:

It is because

he possesses the other moral excellences that
the megalopsychos has the self-respect to
"think himself worthy" of further great action,
the action that will further enhance the nobility
of his soul.

This is the essence of megalo

psychia.
1 3.5 1114b 28.

24.1 1120a 13.

CHAPTER II
THE PLACE OF MEGALOPSYCHIA
IN ARISTOTLE 'S ETHI'CS
Ostensibly, 4.3 sets forth a man
basically concerned with externally bestowed
honor.

It opens stating that the megalopsychos

"thinks himself worthy of great things," it
closes stating that "megalopsychia, then, is
concerned with honor on the grand scale, as has
been said."

An open and shut case— it seems.

Yet it completely misses the essence and the
spirit of Aristotle's megalopsychos.

Any

interpretation that starts from the premise that
the megalopsychos is primarily concerned with
externally bestowed honor will fail to capture
his essence.
It will also fail to see the rela
tionship of megalopsychia to the rest of
Aristotle's ethical thinking.

Important here

is what one makes of the relationship between
EN 4.3 and 4.4, the chapter that deals with
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right ambition.

This is the virtue, Aristotle

tells us, "which would appear to be related to
megalopsychia as generosity is to magnificence.
For neither of these has anything to do with the
grand scale, but both dispose us as is right
with regard to middling and unimportant objects."

A

Even more important is the fact that 4.4, this
chapter on right ambition, does not appear in
the earlier Eudemian Ethics.

What is the

relationship of EN 4.3 and M

4.4, and why is a

separate chapter on right ambition absent in the
earlier version of Aristotle's ethics?

How one

answers these questions have major implications
for a wider question:

What is the relation of

4.3 to the rest of Aristotle's ethical thinking?
There is no better demonstration of this
than in the work on magnanimity by the contemporary
French philosopher, Rene'”Gauthier. In his monuo
mental work by that title, and in his later
14.4 1125b 2-7.
%IagnanimitfT. L' ideal de la grandeur
dans la philosophicJoaienne et dans la theologie
cretienne (Paris: Bib1iotheque~Thomiste,
’SSTTfl j 1’951)» hereafter cited as Gauthier,
Magnanxmite'.
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commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics,

Gauthier

explicitly addresses these questions.

In

light of the sheer comprehensiveness of his work,
no study of megalopsychia would be complete
without a mention of him.

This is especially

so in my case since his interpretation of
Aristotle's megalopsychos stands in profound
opposition to mine.

G-authier assumes that the

object of megalopsychia is great honor, and
develops the view that the megalopsychos is a
theoretikos.

He bases his case to a large ex

tent on what he takes to be the relationship of
EH 4.5 and 4*4, and on what he sees as the
reason for the absence of 4.4 in the Eudemian
Ethics.
Gauthier begins by calling attention to
Aristotle's distinction between small and great
honor.

He claims that the former, in Aristotle's

mind, is rendered by the masses for moral virtue,
v
^R. A. Gauthier et J. Y. Jolif, L'Sthique
a Nicomaque. Introduction, traduction et
coinmentaire, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Louvaine: Pub
lications universitaires, 1970; hereafter cited
as Gauthier, Commentaire). Although this work
appears to be a joint effort, both in translation
and in commentary, all my references will be to
Gauthier alone.
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the latter for intellectual virtue.

Aristotle,

he points out, regards all in the domain of
action as insignificant when measured against
the life of theoria.

From this Gauthier deduces

that 4.3, whose concern is great honor, is a
treatise on the theoretikos, and that 4.4, whose
concern is small honor, is a treatise on the
practlkos.
This explains, Gauthier believes, why
4.4 is absent in the Budemian,Ethics.
Aristotle’s thinking, he says, was confused
at the time he wrote EE 3-5» the Budemian
chapter on megalopsychia.

He was trying to

synthesize two types of megalopsychia:

the

megalopsychia of the practikos which involves a
refusal to bear insult, and the megalopsychia
of the theoretikos which involves impassibility
before the vicissitudes of fortune.

As Gauthier

points out, Posterior Analytics 2, written at
the same time as the Budemian Ethics. indicates
that Aristotle was aware of these two common
^Magnanimite'', p. 113«

10.8, 11?8bl7I

He cites EH-

significations of megalopsychia.
fails to synthesize them.

■>]

But 3-5

As it turns out,

the megalopsychos suffers from not receiving
the honor he merits, and this conflicts with
his supposed impassibility before ill fortune.

p

Later when Aristotle writes the Nicomachean
account of megalopsychia, he follows it with
a chapter on right ambition in order to avoid
repeating that failure.

By accounting for the

mega.lopsychia of the practikos in 4.4, he leaves
4.3 to develop exclusively the megalopsychia
of the theoretikos.^
Now Gauthier's reconstruction certainly
has the merit of coherence.
issue is:

However, the critical

Is the Nicomachean megalopsychos

a theoretikos. as Gauthier claims?
is convinced that he is.

Gauthier

If we examine 4.3,

he says, we find that the life of the raegalo^Post. Anal. 2.13 97b 16-25- Gauthier,
a g n a n i m i t e .114■> places the time of these
writings in the middle period of Aristotle's
life, during his stay in Assos, 348-347*
2See 1232b 13.
%agnanimite, pp. 113-114.

psychos is a life of leisure.

His life in

volves idleness, for he is a man of few actions.
He is slow to act except when great issues or
great honors are at stake.

We know that he

delays, decides slowly, does not readily ex
pose himself to risks, is not ambitious for
high public position.

In short, Gauthier de

clares , II n* a rien de 1 1allure d'un homme
&'action, "He has nothing of the style of a man

o f action.11

Instead, he is slow of step,

has a deep voice, and level utterance, and he
2
is not easily excited.
Gauthier's conclusion:
Le magnanime est done essentiellement homme de
loisir, "Thus

the megalopsychos is essentially

a man of leisure."^

And that implies, Gauthier

says, that he is a philosopher.

As he puts it:

II ne manque pas de serieuses raisons de penser
qu'en fait le philosophe est bien le seul a
pouvoir etre magnanime, "There is no lack of
serious reasons for thinking that, in fact, the
1Ibid., p. 109.

24.5 1125a 14-15.

% agnanimite\ p. 109*
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1

philosopher alone is able to be megalopsychos.11
His life is one of few actions, and "if the
megalopsychos spends his life neither producing
nor taking action, for what end would he then
spend it except contemplation."

p

Aristotle does indeed tell us that the
megalopsychos is "a man of few deeds, but of
great and.notable ones."^

This, understandably,

is one of Gauthier's major citations, and therefore it is necessary that any interpretation
of the megalopsychos as a practikos accounts for
it.
First of all, we need to note that
Aristotle immediately precedes it with:

"It

is characteristic of the megalopsychos not to
aim at the things commonly held in honor, or
the things in which others excel; to delay and
to hold back except where great honor or a
great work is at stake."

A few lines later

1
^
Magnanimite. p. 112, Commentaire, 2:290.
p

Ibid. This is precisely the way
Aristotle speaks of the theoretikos in 10.8 at
11?8b 20.

^1124b 26.
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Aristotle adds that "the man who takes few
things seriously is not likely to he hurried,
nor the man who thinks nothing great to be
excited, while a shrill voice and a rapid gait
are the results of hurry and excitement*"
What these statements indicate is that
the megalopsychos does not squander his
energy on unimportant pursuits; he does not
hurry after things commonly but mistakenly held
in honor, such as wealth and power.

Aristotle,

then, describes the megalopsychos as a man of
few actions to make vivid his contrast with
shallow men.- It comes as no surprise, there
fore, that Aristotle's moral virtues, excluding
magnificence, are only ten in number.

They are

few, and they require relatively few actions
for their implementation.

Thus in a chapter as

brief as 4.3 Aristotle is able to describe the
megalopsychos implementing them all, and this
includes right ambition.

As a result, the

separation that Gauthier imposes between 4.3
and 4.4 simply does not exist.
1 1125a 13-16.

Gauthier's
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statement that the megalopsychos "has nothing
of the style of a man of action" is clearly less
than plausible.
Consistent with his view that 4.5 deals
essentially with a man of leisure, is Gauthier's
belief that the great things of which the
megalopsychos thinks himself worthy are great
honors, not great action.

How does Gauthier

reconcile this belief with Aristotle's criticism
of the micropsychos— not for shunning great
honors— but for standing back from noble action
and undertakings?

He answers:

There is here a slip, un glissement,
in Aristotle's thinking: the expression
"to Judge oneself unworthy of" has always,
up to now, had exterior goods as its ex
clusive object (cf. especially 1125b 17) J
that of which the megalopsychos Judges
himself worthy, are exterior goods; as to
great acts of virtue, the megalopsychos
does not Judge himself worthy of them, he
should already have achieved them in order to
have the right to Judge himself worthy of
exterior goods. In other words, great
acts of virtue are a precondition of
megalopsychia, whereas exterior goods are
the object of them. If Aristotle re
mained faithful to that conception, small
ness of soul would have to consist of ac
complishing great acts of virtue, and in
not Judging oneself worthy of the exterior
goods of which one is therefore worthy.
On the contrary, it here consists essentially
for Aristotle in not accomplishing great
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acts of virtue, because one judges oneself
unworthy of them. This slip of thought
comes, it appears, from an equivocation
on the expression ..., "to judge oneself
unworthy of": Aristotle gives to it, when
he is concerned with megalopsychia, the
meaning of "to think that one has a right
to," whereas, when he is concerned with
•smallness of soul, he permits to it the
meaning that the common people used:
"to
think that one-is capable of." In other
words, Aristotle did not take the trouble
to conduct his treatment of vice with the
^
same thorough effort that he gave to virtue.
It is obvious why Gauthier must take
such pains to establish that it is great honors,
not great actions, of which the megalopsychos
thinks himself worthy.

If the "thinks himself

worthy" passage refers to great actions, then
it clearly presents a major stumbling block
to Gauthier's argument that the megalopsychos
is a theoretikos.

Yet only by recognizing that

this indeed _is Aristotle's meaning do his
criticisms of the micro-psychos and the self
inflated in terms of deficiency and excess of
action make sense.

This recognition is surely

preferable to Gauthier's accusation that
Aristotle slipped up in his thinking.
^Commentaire. 2:297-298.
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How then are we to explain the absence
of a chapter on right ambition in the Eudemian
Ethics and the need for it in the Nicomachean?
The answer is far more direct than Gauthier’s.
What is evident when we look at these two ver
sions of megalopsychia are two markedly dif
ferent attitudes toward honor.

EE 3»5 makes

clear that the megalopsychos's basic concern
is honor.

"As to the accepted objects of human

interest, honor, life, wealth,” says Aristotle,
"he is thought to care nothing about any of them
except honor; it would grieve him to be dishonored
and ruled by.someone unworthy, and his greatest
joy is to obtain honor."

a

Furthermore, Aristotle makes clear that
this concern is specifically for the honor that
accompanies such things as high office.

"In

reality," Aristotle says, "those offices and
other good things are honorable and worthy of
serious pursuit that are truly great."

A

1252b 11-13.

^1252b 23.

Then,

Rackham translation.

in discussing the micropsychos % Aristotle .
indicates that another of these "good things"
is a noble birth.

"Nobody would call a nan

microps.ychos," he says, "for not claiming to
hold office and submitting to authority if
he is a resident alien, but one would do so if
he were of noble birth and attached great im'I
portance to office."
In contrast to this is 1

4.3 where the

megalopsychos is again concerned with honor, but
with crucial differences:

Aristotle emphasizes

that the honor is bestowed for virtue, and that
for the megalopsychos "not even this honor is the
greatest thing."

While the Nicomachean megalo-

psychos is "moderately pleased" at the honor he
receives, the Eudemian finds his "greatest.joy"
in it.

As one commentator concludes:

"Aristotle

has apparently changed his mind about the im
portance of external goods as such; and, as a
consequence, he reaches a quite different con'l1233a 28-30.
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A
elusion about the nature of megalopsychia."
It is because of this that 4.4 malces its ap
pearance in the Nicomachean Ethics.
The middling and the small which are the
concern of philotimia can only be external
goods, i.e. to use Aristotle's own examples,
power ... and wealth, l^hese may be great
of their kind, but the honor which accrues
from them is small when compared with the
honor with which the megalopsychos is
(supposedly) concerned, that is, the honor
which is accorded to virtue. Philotimia,
then, is defined as the right pursuit of
external goods. If this is so, we can see
at once why there is no mention of the vir
tue of philotimia in the Eudemian Ethics;
there, external'goods fall within the sphere
of megalopsychia itself.2
G-authier, in contrast, is bound to mis
construe the actual relation of 4.4 to 4.3
if for no other reason than that he misconstrues
the meaning of.each chapter separately.

Aristotle

tells us that megalopsychia "seems even from its
Rowe, Development of Aristotle’s Thought.
p. 50* As Rowe points out, while the Eudemian
and Nicomachean treatments of most of the moral
virtues are substantially the same, megalopsychia
is an important exception.
p

Ibid., p. 51. The author uses philotimia
to stand for the virtue (which I render by the
traditional "right ambition"), while in the text
philotimia stands for the vice. He uses it, for
convenience, for the virtue, he says, because
Aristotle himself has no name for it.

name to be concerned with great things*"

Con

cerning 4-.4-, therefore, we need to ask Gauthier:
Since Aristotle expressly says that 4-.4- has
nothing "to do with the grand scale," how does
he justify assigning to it the subject of the
megal'onsychia

of the practikos?

Aristotle has

implicitly prohibited this.
Concerning 4*3 we need to ask Gauthier:
Is megalopsychia an intellectual virtue, or is
it a moral virtue that only the theoretikos
can practice?

It is difficult to pin Gauthier

down on this question.

"There is no lack of

serious reasons," he has said, "for thinking
that, in fact, the philosopher alone is able to
be megalopsychos."

If Gauthier is saying that

only the theoretikos can be megalopsychos, and
this seems to be his meaning, then he is saying
that if a man is a megalopsychos, he. is a
theoretikos.
But, as if anticipating this implication,
Gauthier, in the same place as the quotation
just recalled, hedges.

"Megalopsychia," he

quickly adds, "is assuredly a moral virtue—

never doubt it— even if this moral virtue, by
its particular nature could in fact be practiced
only through the contemplative life of the

A

philosopher.11

So G-authier does give a definite answer
to* the above question; he explicitly states
that megalopsychia is a moral virtue.

But this

only raises another difficulty for G-authier.
Shortly after saying that the "moral11 virtue,
megalopsychia, by its particular nature could be
practiced only through philosophic contemplation,
he says:

Ni la production ni 1 Action ne sont

le domaine du magnanime,

"Neither production

nor action are the province of the megalopsychos.
Yet somehow he is able to practice a moral virtue
This is not an isolated statement.

Nineteen

years earlier, Gauthiers view was the same:
II n ^ rien de 1 1allure d'un homme d i c t i o n ,,
"He [the megalopsychos]] has nothing of the style
of a man of action."^
^Commentaire, 2:290.
^Magnanimite", p. 109.

^Ibid.

I
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But then we must ask Gauthier what
sense it makes to say that megalopsychia is a
moral virtue?

He explicitly states that meg-

alopsychia is a moral virtue, hut leaves the
megalopsychos with no means to practice it:
action.
Gauthier's oscillations aside, it is
possible to view his position as an attempt,
via the megalopsychos. to bridge the gap
produced by Aristotle's bifurcation of human
life into two spheres, the intellectual and
the moral.

This is especially manifest in

Gauthier's view that megalopsychia is a moral
virtue that only the theoretikos can practice.
What if we amend Gauthier's extreme
stand, however, and remove the "only"?

Now we

would have the position that megalopsychia is
a moral virtue that the theoretikos as well as
the practikos can practice.

After all, Aristotle

makes abundantly clear that moral virtue in
volves the simultaneous practice of phronesis.
an intellectual virtue.

Since the megalopsychos

is a phronimos, why not also a theoretikos?
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Before we can meaningfully answer this,
however, there is a more fundamental question.
Granted that the megalopsychos if a phronimos,
is his basic concern with the moral life or the
theoretical?
A number of recent commentators have
observed that Aristotle's treatment of phronesis
undergoes a significant alteration between the
time he wrote the two versions of his ethics.
Stated briefly, the Nicomachean version limits
phronesis to the moral sphere, whereas the
Eudemian version permits it to encompass both
the moral and intellectual spheres.

And this is

fully consistent with the general acceptance
of the Eudemian Ethics as the earlier version,
a work in'which Aristotle was closer to his Platonic
beginnings.

The use of phronesis to denote both

practical and philosophic wisdom is a well known
position of Plato.

It was not until the later

/|
Among them: Bartling, "Megalopsychia,"
pp. 186-201; W. Jaeger, Aristotle« Fundamentals
of the History of His Development, trans. (from
the 1923 1st ed. in German) R. Robinson, 2d ed.
(London, 194-8), pp. 66-10*1, 232-246, cited and
summarised as part of Bartling's account; Rowe,
Development of Aristotle's Thought, pp. 63-72.

1
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Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle precisely
sets phronesis apart as a technical concept
referring solely to practical wisdom.

The fact

that the megalopsychos is a nhronimos then—
instead of lending support to the doctrine that
the megalopsychos could as easily be a theoret
ikos as a practikos— -suggests the opposite
conclusion.
Gauthier believes that a rapproachement
between megalopsychia and theoria can be found
in

M

1.10.

At 1100b 19, he notes, "the happy

man will always do and contemplate. Oc(oP'nlr^ /«
that which is in conformity with virtue.”

And

"it is interesting to note," Gauthier continues,
that "it is this man who, several lines later,
will be called megalopsychos (1100b 32)."^
But we must call Gauthier's suggested
rapproachement into question.

Aristotle states

in 6.12 that "philosophic wisdom will contemplate
none of the things that will make a man happy
(for it is not concerned with any coming into
^Magnanimite, p. 106. In Ross's trans
lation of this passage for the Oxford edition,
this is the man who "bears with resignation many
great misfortunes, not through insensibility to
pain but through nobility and megalopsychia."
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A
being)."

Earlier, at 6.1, Aristotle says that

the part of the soul which grasps a rational
principle can be divided into two parts:

"bne

by which we contemplate the kind of things whose
originative causes are invariable, and one by
p
which we contemplate variable things."
Clearly the former applies to EN. 10.7 and 10.8,
while the latter applies to 1.10 where megalo
psychia and theoria appear in the same context.
Nor is this an isolated instance; in 4.2 mag
nificence and theoria also appear in the same
context.

ze.

The two types of theoria. then, are not

to be conflated as Gauthier does.
•^oes this mean, then, that the life of
the megalopsychos and the life of the theoretikos
are mutually exclusive?

If a man is megalopsychos,

does that automatically bar him from the
theoretical life?

Aristotle hints that it does.

When he cites Anaxagoras and Thales as practi11143b 19.

211S9a 5-8.

^At 1122a 34-35*
"The magnificent man
is like an artist; for he can see,
what
if fitting and spend large sums tastefully."
Cited by Bartling, "Megalopsychia," p. 191.
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tioners of the theoretical life, he says:.
This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales and
men like them have philosophic hut not
practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant
of what is to their own advantage, and why
we say that they know things that are
remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine,
but useless; vis. because it is not human
goods that they seek.'l
No doubt, when Aristotle wrote this, he had in
mind Plato's playful reference to Thales as the
astronomer who fell into a well because his eyes
p
were fixed on the heavens.
This anecdote
symbolizes Aristotle's later point that practical
endeavors can be impediments, £^7^057

to the

•x.

life of theoria.^

Yet, despite such considerations, how
strictly would Aristotle have us keep separate
the megalopsychos and the theoretikos?

An

answer to this involves addressing that peren
nial question in Aristotelian scholarship:

What

is the relationship between the moral and in
tellectual spheres in Aristotle's ethics?

Does

the thesis that the megalopsychos is basically
16.7 " m i b 3-8.

2Theaetetus 174.

5EN 10.8 1178b 5.
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concerned to enhance the nobility of his soul
through a life of moral action throw any light
on this wider issue?

I believe that it does.

The standard view is that in a life of
eudaimonia, the "flourishing1' life, "intellectual
values are made dominant, while moral activity
is regarded as just a constantly necessary means
to this dominant end."

On this view, which

has textual support, megalopsychia would be in
p
the service of theoria.
But, as the just-cited.
commentator observes,
One might expect .... that in his [Aristotle1sj
delineation of the moral virtues some signs
of this thesis would occasionally be visible,
if he in fact accepted it. But such in
dications as there are, one way or the other
seem to tell against the hypothesis that
Aristotle thought a morally virtuous
character necessary for the fullest pos- ,
sible realization of intellectual values."’
This formulation, although not his own
view, belongs to John M. Cooper, Reason and
Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard
’University Press , '1975) » P» 153 (hereafter cited
as Cooper, Human Good). In what follows, I
adopt Cooper's very apt rendering of "eudaimonia”
by the concept "flourishing."
2Cooper cites W 1.7 "1098a 16-18, 1.15
11?7a 12-18, 6.7 1141a~20-22, 6.12 1143b 33-35«
^Cooper, Human Good, p. 108. See also
pp. 108-110 for Cooper's” elaboration on this and
on other considerations against the standard view.
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One might

especially expect this of Aristotle

somewhere in 4.3 where he spells out the in
gredients of his moral ideal in such minute
detail.

But he does not.
However, by citing Aristotle's

treatise

on friendship in arguing my interpretation of
4.3, it might appear that I have put the megalo
psychos into the service of theoria.

The

megalopsychos, as a good man, I have pointed
out, will always "seek for himself the things
that are noblest and best.”

How this occurs in

a context where Aristotle identifies the person
with nous.

He writes:

He therefore who loves and indulges the
dominant part of himself is a lover of self
in the fullest degree ... the terms 'selfrestrained' and 'unrestrained' denote being
restrained or not by one's intellect, y 0 oys
and thus imply that the intellect is the man
himself. Also it is our reasoned acts that
are felt to be in the fullest sense our own
acts, voluntary acts. It therefore is clear
that a man is or is chiefly the dominant part
of himself, and that a good man values this
part of himself most.'l
Does this not make a concern for the activity of
his mind the ultimate concern of the megalopsychos?
19.8 1168b 33-1169a 3» Rackham translation.
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And i f so, does this not tell against the strict
separation of the megalospychos and theoretikos
at which we have seen Aristotle so strongly hint?
To decide the first question we need
to go back to the cited passage in which Aristotle
identifies the good man with his mind.

In

doing so, v/e discover that Aristotle is
actually referring to the mind as employed in
a moral context.
As his ... identification of a person with
his mind shows, he is thinking of a person
as identical with that in him which properly
ought to decide what he is to do and which
controls and guides his inclinations and
desires in their job of moving his limbs
and generating actions— in short, vjlth his
practical reason. The mind which is in con
trol in the self-controlled man and out of
control in the incontinent is the practical
reason, whose virtue, phronesis, is said in
the sixth book to consist' in issuing
commands (11A5a 8). '
Thus, Aristotle’s identification of the good
man with his mind, in such a context, does not
provide a ground for making theoretical pursuit
Cooper, Human Good, p. 172. He also
cites, p. 172, n« 24', 'two other passages, 9
1166a 10-25 and 6.2 1159a 29-3^ s that corroborate
his analysis. It is only in Book 10, Cooper
points out, that Aristotle identifies the person
with theoretical mind. Cooper makes much of this
fact in the position he ultimately arrives at con-
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the ultimate concern of the megalopsychos.
This of course would not rule out all
such concern.

Men such as Pericles, Solon,

Socrates, granting that they are megalopsychoi,
were no doubt concerned to advance, each in
his capacity as_statesman (or gadfly),
theoretical pursuits.

Prom this perspective,

we can readily see certain megalopsychoi serving
as ’'political’* bridges between the moral and in
tellectual spheres.

It is here that those

.passages in which Aristotle seems to regard
moral activity as just the constantly necessary
precondition.of theoretical activity might find
their application.
Aristotle makes clear, however, that on
the private level of the human individual the
moral life flourishes quite independently of
the theoretical.

"In a secondary degree," he

states, "the life in accordance with the other
cerning the relationship between the moral and
intellectual spheres in Aristotle*s ethics.
See pp. 155-186.
■^Bartling, "Megalopsychia," p. 192,
points this out iD connection with Pericles.
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kind of virtue

[the moral]

is happy, for the

activities in accordance with this befit our
human estate.”

Where does the megalopsychos's

basic concern, enhancing the nobility of his
soul through moral action, fit into this type
of life?

It fits in as just that, a basic

concern.

His ultimate concern remains

secondary-degree-eudaimonia, or

moral flourish

ing, while nobility of soul is a basic ingredient.
Indeed, given Aristotle’s conception of megalo
psychia, it is the basic ingredient of the
morally flourishing life.
To what extent, then, might intellectual
activity be a part of that life?

If we look

to 4-.3, we can recall that the megalopsychos is
a man of "few actions.”

Although this does not

permit Gauthier’s extreme inference, it does
leave open the possibility that the megalo
psychos would engage in theoretical activity should
time permit.

Likewise for the theoretikos; we

have no reason to suppose that he would not in
volve himself in moral pursuits.

110.8 1178a 8-9.

As Aristotle
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stresses, in so far as he is human, he cannot
avoid them.

At issue, as one commentator

sensibly puts it,
is not whether a given philosopher may,
under unusual circumstances, exchange roles
.with the man of supreme practical ac
complishments. The question, rather, is
what actions, however infrequent, are
within the range of the normal and the
expected for the ideal type of the
theoretikos bios as described in Book X
of the nicomachean Ethics.^
The theoretikos, he goes on to say, “is and remains
an ethical being.

His minimal participation in

the ethikai aretai, however, does not win him the
title of megalopsychos.

The megalopsychos, on the

other hand, could theoretically encroach on the
domain of the bio3 theoretikos without necessarily
becoming a full-fledged philosophos."^
Aristotle, then, sets forth two ideal
types in his Nicomachean Ethics;

the theoretikos

of 10.7 and the megalopsychos of 4-.3 .

Although

we will not, in Aristotle’s view, find them em
bodied, as types, in the same person, they might
110.8 1178a 26-27.
p

Bartling, "Megalopsychia,” p. 161.

5Ibid., p. 215.
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nevertheless partially engage in each other*6
characteristic activities, given the right
circumstances.

But 4.3 does not support the

standard view thab Aristotle sees moral activity
as "just s constantly necessary means to in
tellectual activity."

Aristotle clearly grants

the morally flourishing life, as exemplified by
the megalopsychos, a separate status.
Of course, Aristotle stresses that such
a life' is of less worth than the theoretically
flourishing life.

But I want-to stress that

what we make of this difference, looking at the
Nicomachean Ethics as a whole, is profoundly .
affected by what we make of Aristotle's con
ception of megalopsychia.

If 4.3 gives us a

man who is basically concerned with externally
bestowed honor, which is the prevailing view,
then Aristotle's megalopsychos is profoundly in
ferior to his theoretikos.

But if the megalo

psychos is a man basically concerned, not with
externally bestowed honor, but with the nobility
of his soul, his self-respect, then his contrast
with the theoretikos is strikingly lessened.

In
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short, I am urging that Aristotle's theory of
moral good, as idealized and concretized in the
person of his megalopsychos, has far greater
importance in Aristotle's mind than the usual
interpretations of 4.3 are able to admit.
Quite aside from this, however, it is not
the content of 4.3, the type of actions, or
activity, being described that is so important,
as the fact that these actions, and the type of
life to which they add up, are gauged to enhance
one's nobility of soul, one's sense of honor— in
short, one's self-respect.

Aristotle's distinct

achievement in 4.3 is that he identified the mean
ing and championed the importance of moral
enthusiasm.

For Aristotle, there is more to

the good life than simply avoiding evil.
he puts it:

As

"It is more characteristic of vir

tue to do what is noble than not to do what is
base."

For no virtue does he emphasize this

more than for the virtue of megalopsychia.

CHAFTER III
ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF MEGALOPSYCHIA
AFTER ARISTOTLE
For those acquainted with 4.3's notorious
"bad press, it comes as no surprise that Aristotle's
conception of megalopsychia has had a negligible
impact on later ethical thought.
"Magnanimity," the present day descendent
of "megalopsychia," confirms this.

Basically,

all that "magnanimity" retains of Aristotle's
"megalopsychia" is the generosity of mind to
forgive and forget an injury.
What has happened to Aristotle's lofty
conception of megalopsychia?
fluence been so negligible?

Why has its in
Why does it, even

today, receive a bad press?
This chapter will propose and explore
three basic reasons.

First, megalopsychia has

been widely misunderstood.

Second, those who

did understand it, profoundly altered Aristotle's
meaning.

Third, megalopsychia, as an ideal,
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calls for a moral elite.
has taken its toll.

Each of these reasons

Nevertheless, Aristotle's

conception of megalopsychia, we shall see, con
tinues its existence under a different name.
Of the misunderstandings, the fundamental
one, I have repeatedly emphasized, is the idea
that Aristotle's megalopsychos is a man primarily
concerned with externally bestowed honor.

Be

cause of this idea he has been labeled a "stuffed
shirt," a conceited, bad-mannered "prig," a
man "divinely jealous of .his superiority," con
cerned always to be "one up on his fellow man."
He has been found "unpleasing" because he does
not abase himself "before the ideal of duty,"
even "intolerable."

He has even been seen as

a "strange incubus," enough to make one
"shudder.
Such comments betray a superficial
understanding of Aristotle's conception of
megalopsychia.

The superficiality lies in

the failure to see beyond the surface appear
ances of Book 4 chapter 5 of the Nicomachean

A
•Above, pp. 5-8.
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Ethics, appearances that seem to make external
honor the basic concern of the megalopsychos.
The many problems with this interpretation
have been detailed already, and in its place
I have argued that the megalopsychos's basic
concern is to enhance the nobility of his soul
through a life of moral action.

That is, his

concern is not with externally bestowed honor
but with his sense of inner honor.
The failure to recognaize this is a
fundamental misunderstanding underlying three
others.

One of them is that Aristotle is not

really serious in his portrait of the megalo
psychos.

Another quite different misunderstand

ing is that he is presenting the ideal man of the
life of theoria, the theoretikos.

Finally,

it leads to the view that megalopsychia is not
a separate virtue.
According to the first of these, 4-.3
is a piece of humor, with the second it is ir
relevant to the moral life, and with the third
it is insignificant.

Since these views are by

no means uncommon, it is understandable that
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Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia has had
no real impact on later ethical thinking.
Therefore, to better ensure the recognition it
deserves, it is necessary to examine each of
these misunderstandings.
The charge that Aristotle was not really
serious in 4.3 has had a number of versions.

Some

commentators see it as a caricature, others as
a piece of humor.

Still others see it as

satirical or half-ironical.

To understand

these notions we need to ask:

About what, or,

better, about whom, was Aristotle being
humorous or half-ironical?:
caricaturing or satirizing?

Whom was he
One commentator

provides a clue when he says 4.3 reveals "that
Aristotle had an undue admiration for the .uppermiddle-class gentlemen of his day."
even more explicit.

Another is

Aristotle's treatment of

moral virtue, he declares, "presents a lively and
often amusing account of the qualities admired

A
Abraham Edel, Aristotle (New York:
Dell Publishing 0o., 1967 ) , p. 137•
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or disliked by cultivated Greeks of Aristotle's
time."7*
We can infer from such statements, it
appears, that, if there is an object of caric
ature or satire in 4-.3, then it is the cultivated
upper class of Aristotle's day.

This .notion is

the more easily adopted, of course, by those
who see the megalopsychos as basically con
cerned with external honor.

For them the megalo

psychos belongs to that class of men who, as
Aristotle puts it, "seem to pursue honor in
order that they may be assured of their goodo
ness."
When, on that basis, these same men
make a claim to greatness of soul, they become
preposterous.

And when they affect the deep

voice, level utterances, and unhurried steps
of the man of 4-.3, they become all the more
ridiculous and pompous.
To repeat, however, Aristotle's megalo
psychos could impress a commentator this way
Ross, Aristotle, p. 202.

21.5 1095b 27.

Above, p. 30.

73

only were he first to misconstrue him as basically
concerned with externally bestowed honor.

But

Aristotle, as we have already seen, clearly states
that "those who without virtue have such goods
[as those.of the upper class:

power, wealth

and position^ are neither justified in making
great claims nor entitled to the name of megalo
psychos."

And when he speaks of the megalo

psychos' s deep voice, level utterances and
unhurried steps, he is contrasting him with the
man who, undoubtedly like many, of the upper
class, dissipates himself and his resources on
shallow pursuits.

"The man who takes few

things seriously," Aristotle suggests, "is not
likely to be hurried, nor the man who thinks
nothing, g rea t. to be excited, while a shrill
voice and a rapid gait are the results of hurry
and excitement."

A

Thus, even were it true that Aristotle
is describing an upper class virtue, it cer
tainly is less than clear that he is caricaturing
or satirizing the practitioner of that virtue.
11125 a 14-16.
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He emphasizes that goodness is the ground for
megalopsychia, not upper class status, power,
wealth or any other external good.

But it does

not even seem true that Aristotle is describing
an upper class virtue.

We have already seen that

the qualities of the magnificent man are, among
all the virtuous qualities described by Aristotle
in his Nicomachean Ethics, the only ones that
are not made a necessary part of the megalopsychos's personality.

A

We must conclude,

therefore, that the notion that 4.3 is in some
way a piece of humor, specifically humor directed
at the upper-class of Aristotle's time, cannot
be taken seriously.
Implied by the claim that Aristotle is
concerned with upper class virtues is an allied
misconception.

This is the notion that he was

not original in his treatment of megalopsychia.
However, if an accepted conception of megalo
psychia were available to Aristotle, it seems
that he was not aware of it.

Scholars agree that

Aristotle's logical works were earlier than his

A
Above, pp. 25-27.
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Nicomachean Ethics.

Both the Posterior Analytics

and the Rhetoric suggest that an accepted
conception of megalopsychia did not exist in
Aristotle's day.

In the Analytics Aristotle cites

two significations of megalopsychia:

refusal

to bear insult, and impassibility in the face
of ill fortune.
another:

In the Rhetoric Aristotle cites

"magnificence."

One further signif

ication also existed in Aristotle's time:
ability to bear an offense with composure.

the
Y/e

find this in a fragment of Democritus, in the last
years of the 5th century and the first years of
the 4-th. ^
None of these qualities, however, is
in the end adopted by Aristotle as definitive
of megalopsychia.

We must conclude, then, that

the suggestion that Aristotle's conception of
megalopsychia is not original, is less than
plausible*

Before Aristotle could have

borrowed an accepted conception of megalopsychia,

11.9 1366b 15-19.
%)K, fr. 4-6. Cited by Gauthier,
Magnanimity p. 18. I shall elaborate on these
four significations of megalopsychia in the next
chapter.
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an accepted conception had to exist.

It clearly

seems that one did not.
Here, however, is where one of Gauthier's
insights becomes relevant.

According to him, the

formula, "to think oneself worthy of great things,
being worthy of them," was a popular formula in
Aristotle's day, not in connection with megalo"I
psychia, but simply as a formula.
Furthermore,
Gauthier says, the "great things" phrase seems
to have referred to great actions.

2

Even more important in this context is
that the megalopsycbos, in his basic concern
to enhance the nobility of his soul, seems to
be heeding Socrates's famous exhortation:

"I

spend all my time going about trying to per
suade you, young and old, to make your first
and chief concern not for your bodies nor for
your possessions, but for the highest welfare of
^Magnanimite^ p. 75« Gauthier points out
that it was used by Demosthenes in For the Crown,
53, 297p
Magnanimite. pp. 76-78. But not for
Aristotle, Gauthierclaims. In Gauthier's view,
Aristotle "profoundly transformed" this popular
meaning.
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<1

your souls."
We have therefore two central elements
of 4-.3? the "thinks himself worthy" passage,
and the concern of the megalopsychos with the
nobility of his soul, neither element originated
by Aristotle himself.

But what was original with

Aristotle is that he made these elements part
of the meaning of megalopsychia.

Aristotle's

crucial contribution is that it is the megalo
psychos whose basic concern is with enhancing
the nobility of his soul.
Between the writing of the two versions
of his ethics, Aristotle radically altered his
conception of megalopsychia.

As we saw, the

Eudemian megalopsychos is not concerned with
honor bestowed for virtue, but rather with the
honor that accompanies the possession of great
external goods.

Thus, there is no doubt that

Aristotle changed his mind about the importance
of external goods as such after he wrote his
Eudemian Ethics.

It would be most surprising

Apology,, 30b. Trans. Hugh Tredennick
in The Last Days of Socrates (Baltimore:
Penguin"iBooks Inc., 1959) •
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to find that this was a result of a change in
the accented meaning of megalopsychia during this
time frame.

Such cultural changes require more

time than that which elapsed between the writing
of the Eudemian and the Nicomachean texts.
They also require the influence of,a thinker
with Aristotle’s influence.
thinker.

V/e know of no such

We must conclude then that Aristotle

himself was the originator of the conception,
that special amalgam of elements, that comes
down to us in 4.3

.

Unlike those commentators who think that
Aristotle was not really being serious (or
original) in his presentation of megalopsychia,
there are those such as Gauthier who think him
so serious (and original) as to propose that
he is actually presenting the theoretikos.

As

already mentioned, this misunderstanding, just
as easily as the first, renders Aristotle's con
ception of megalopsychia ethically irrelevant.
It requires, as we saw with Gauthier, that the
"great things" of which the megalopsychos
thinks himself worthy be taken to refer to great
honor, and not as the text demands to great actions.
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It thereby perpetuates the mistaken notion that
the megalopsychos is a man basically concerned
with externally bestowed honor, a concern that,
not surprisingly, has failed to capture the at=e
tention of moral philosophers after Aristotle.
Furthermore, it leaves Aristotle's treat
ment of the moral realm without an ideal.

This

is a significant loss indeed for, as pointed
out, on the interpretation that Aristotle's
megalopsychos is a man whose basic concern is
to enhance the nobility of his' soul through
moral action, the value of the flourishing moral
life has far-greater importance in Aristotle's
ethics than the usual interpretations of 4.3
are able to grant.

As a result, its potential

for elucidating Aristotle's ethical thinking is
drastically diminished.

Again we witness the

sad result of thinking that Aristotle's megalo
psychos is a man motivated by the desire for ex
ternally bestowed honor.
Another manifestation of this notion is
the view that Aristotle's "megalopsychia'1 is not
really a separate virtue but merely a sum of the
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other virtues.

This view holds that megalo

psychia is simply a reward for excellences al
ready practiced, and, as in the two preceding
views, the great things of which the megalo
psychos thinks himself worthy are still honors,
taibeit honors bestowed by his fellow num for
excellences of character.

Recalling Jaeger

here, "Aristotle does not believe megalopsychia
to be an independent virtue like the others, but
one which- presupposes them and is 'in a way
an ornament to them.1"

We saw above the problems

with taking this narrow perspective on megalopsychxa.

The point here is that such a per

spective, when adopted by commentators on 4.3?
effectively reduces megalopsychia to insignif
icance.

It denies that megalopsychia has an

independent province of its own.

One achieves

the other excellences and megalopsychia auto
matically results.

It is not an active, ongoing,

positive character trait like the other virtues.
That this renders megalopsychia insignificant
needs no further evidence than the fact that

36-59.
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universal justice, the virtue that Jaeger con^
fuses with megalopsychia on this point,

A

has had

no place in subsequent ethical thinking.
it********************
Despite all the misunderstandings to
which 4-.3 has been subjected, however, Aristotle's
vision of a man basically concerned to enhance
the nobility of his soul through a life of moral
action has never been entirely obscured.

For

no two philosophers was this more the case
than for Thomas Aquinas, probably the most in
fluential of Christian thinkers, and, later,
for Friedrich Nietzsche, the great spokesman of
the antichrist.

The interesting thing about

Aquinas and Nietzsche is that these, the two
thinkers who probably best understood the mean
ing and the spirit of 4-.3, even to the point of
openly admiring it, nevertheless cannot, in
retrospect, be regarded as champions of
Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia.
Aquinas's interpretation of 4-.3 con
curs, basically, with that set forth above.

A
Above, pp. 10-11.
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Actually, his account is not really.an interpret
ation at all, but rather a presentation of what
he apparently takes to be quite obvious.

For

instance, in his Summa Theologies it appears
obvious to Aquinas that the megalopsychos is a
man of action.

nA man is called megalopsychos,1*

he says, "chiefly because he has the spirit for
some great act."

A

And in his Commentary on the

Nicomachean Ethics, he states:

"A person seems

to be megalopsychos who thinks himself worthy
of great things, viz., that he.may perform
great deeds and that great things should happen
to him when in fact he is worthy."

He no doubt

has in mind Aristotle*s criticism of micropsychia
where Aristotle makes clear the action orient
ation of the megalopsychos.

In Aquinas*s words,

"The small-souled person is one who refuses to
Second part of the second part, question
129, article 1, reply, trans. Fathers of the
English Dominican Province (London: Burns Oates
& Washbourne, 1932). Hereafter, unless indicated
otherwise, all citations from the Summa Theologica
will be from the second part of the second part,
and will be in the form S.T. 129, 1, reply.
p

Lecture 8, article 730, trans. C. I.
Litzinger, O.P. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.,
1964). Hereafter such citations will be in the
form Commentary 8.736.
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strive after great accomplishments and aims at
certain petty -undertakings when he is truly
/j
capable of what is great."
Aquinas does not
argue these points.

For him it is merely a

matter of looking at the text of 4.3 and citing
them.
To Aquinas it is also obvious that the
megalopsychos is not really concerned with ex
ternal honor but rather with the internal stature
of his soul.

As Aquinas expresses it-, "There is

nothing great for him among the things that can
happen externally, because his whole life is busy
p
with internal goods, which are truly great."
Aquinas leaves no doubt that he admires
Aristotle's megalopsychos.

Nevertheless, he

regards megalopsychia as a pagan virtue,
needing baptism in the v/aters of Christian
doctrine.

This he does by attmepting to rec

oncile megalopsychia with humility.
Aquinas attempts this reconciliation
from a number of perspectives.
of action:

First, in terms

"Humility restrains the appetite from

^C omroent ary.8.740 .

% b i d . 10.777.
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aiming at great things against right reasons
while megalopsychia urges the mind to great
things in accord with right reason.

Kence it

is clear that megalopsychia is not opposed to
humility:

indeed they concur in this, that each

A

is according to right reason."

Second, Aquinas relates megalopsychia
and humility in terms of emotions:

"For Just

as it belongs to megalopsychia to urge the mind
to great things against despair, so it belongs
to humility to withdraw the mind from the -in
ordinate desire of great things against prep
sumption."
Third, he demonstrates the need for a
two fold virtue of megalopsychia and humility by
appeal to man's nature:
Now it has been stated above (I.-II.,
Q. LXI. , A. 2) that for those appetitive
movements which are a kind of impulse toward
an object, there is need of a moderating
and restraining moral virtue, while for
those which are a kind of recoil, there is
need, on the part of the appetite, of a
moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it
on. "Wherefore a twofold virtue is,necessary
with regard to the difficult good.^
^S.T. 161, 1, reply.

^161, 1, reply.

^162, 1, reply.
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Finally, Aquinas explains the need for
both megalopsychia and humility from the per
spective of his world view.

"The reason why

Christ chiefly proposed humility to us," he
writes, "was because it especially removes the
obstacle to m a n ’s spiritual welfare consisting
in man’s aiming at heavenly and spiritual
things, in which he is hindered by striving to
.

become great in earthly things."

A

Humility in all these citations is
understood by Aquinas as a virtue guarding
against presumption, the Greek concept of
hubris.

But'there is more to humility for

him than this.
abasement.

Humility also means self-

"In so far as it is a virtue,"

he writes, it "conveys the notion of a praisep

worthy self-abasement to the lowest place."
And if we investigate further, we find that
self-abasement is what Aquinas regards as the
main meaning of humility.

"Humility," he says,

"regards chiefly the subjection of man to God,
for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting
^161, 5» reply.

. 2161, 1, reply.
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*

himself to others.1'

Also significant for Aquinas's rec
onciliation of megalopsychia and humility is
the fact that, of the two virtues, humility
in his view is by far the more important.

In

so far as it is the "foundation of the spiritual
edifice," humility is the greatest virtue.
explains:

He

"By way of removing obstacles ....

humility holds the first place, inasmuch as it
expels pride, which God resisteth, and makes
man submissive and ever open to receive the
influx of Divine grace.
(James IV 6 )j

Hence it is written

God resisteth the proud. and
p

giveth grace to the humble."
The megalopsychos, Aquinas believes,
needs to realize that his greatness is not his
own achievement but a gift from God.
In man there is a quality of greatness
possessed by God's gift, and a character
istic defect which comes from the weakness
Ibid. Aquinas intensifies the aspect of
self-abasement in his conception of humility in
accepting Benedict's "Twelve Degrees of Humility"
(see 161, 6, reply), Anselm's "Seven Degrees of
Humility" (see 161, 6, reply), and Bernardos
"Twelve Degrees of Humility" (see 162, 4, reply).

2161, 5, reply.
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of his nature, Megalopsychia therefore
makes a man esteem himself worthy of great
things through contemplating the gifts
which he has from God, For example, if he
has great virtue of mind, megalopsychia makes
him strive to attain perfection in virtuous
works; and similarly in the employment of
any other good, for example, knowledge or
fortunate circumstances. But humility
makes a man belittle himselfyjby contemplating
his own particular weakness.
Because of this inherent weakness, man
can accomplish nothing without God’s grace.

He

cannot even prepare himself for the gift of grace
without God's help.

He has to receive grace to

prepare his soul to receive grace.

This doctrine

of intense determinism Aquinas takes-to the
point of predestination, although he still
talks of "free" choice.
... The predestined must necessarily be
saved, yet by a conditional necessity, which
does not do away with the liberty of choice ....
Man's turning to God is by free
choice; and thus man is bidden to turn
himself to God. But free choice can be
turned to God only when God turns it ....
It is the part of man to prepare his soul,
since he does this by his free choice. And
yet he does not do this without the help
of God moving him .... Even the good move
ment of free choice, whereby anyone is pre
pared for receiving the gift of grace,:.is
an act of free choice moved by God ....

/|129»

reply
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Man's preparation for grace is from God, ^
as mover, and from free choice, as moved*
*********************
Although Nietzsche nov/here makes direct
reference to 4-.3, there is no lack of references
in his work to the expression "greatness of
soul."

"Gracefulness," he tells us in Thus

Spoke Zarathustra, "is part of the graciousness
of the great-souled."

2

In Beyond Good and Evil

he recalls that "in the age of Socrates ....
irony may have been required for greatness of
soul."^
More important than these,, hovrever,
is Nietzsche's connection of greatness of soul
and love for the truth in The Antichrist.

He

'I

S.T. Part one: 23, 3» reply; part one
of the second part: 109» 6, reply; 112, 2,
reply; 112, 3> reply. Cited by W. T. Jones,
The Medieval Mind (New York: Harcourt, Brace
E~World, 1969771?. 283.
p

Part 2, sect. 13. Trans. Walter
Kaufmann, The Portable Nietzsche (New York:
Yiking Press, Penguin Books, 1968). Hereafter,
such citations will be in the form: Zarathustra
2.13.
%>art 6, sect. 212. (Cf. EN 4.3 1124b 30.)
Trans. Walter Kaufmann, Beyond Good and Evil
(New York: Random House’, Vintage Books ,""19"66) •
Hereafter such citations will be in the form:
Beyond Good 6.212.
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writes:

"At every step one has to wrestle for

truth; one has to surrender for it almost everything
to which the heart, to which our love, our trust
in life, cling otherwise.
of soul:
ice.

That requires greatness

the service of truth is the hardest serv

What does it mean, after all, to have

integrity in matters of the spirit."

A

With

this we recall that Aristotle introduces the
megalopsychos in terms of his truthfulness, as a
man "who thinks himself worthy of great things,
being worthy of them."
In The Will to Power Nietzsche states that
"greatness of soul cannot be separated from
greatness of mind.

For it involves independence;

and without greatness of mind this should not
p

be permitted, as it causes mischief."'
But the passage that best indicates that
q
Sect. 50. Trans. Walter Kaufmann, The
Portable Nietzsche.
^Sect. 984. Cited by Walter Kaufmann,
Nietzsche: Philosopher. Psychologist. Antichrist.
4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton U'niversity Press,”
197^)i P° 584 (hereafter cited as Kaufmann,
Nietzsche).
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Nietzsche has captured the spirit of 4-.3 is
not one in which he explicitly uses the phrase
"greatness of soul*"

It is a passage in which

he describes the "noble man":

"It is some

fundamental certainty which a noble soul has
about itself, something which is not to be
sought, is not to he found, and perhaps, also,
is not to be lost .... The noble soul has
reverence for itself."

y\

It is almost as if

Nietzsche had Aris-totle's description of the
self-love of the good man before him.

"Such a

man," we saw, "would seem more than the other a
lover of self; at all events he assigns to him
self the things that are noblest and best."
Kaufmann remarks that "Aristotle's con
ception [of megalopsychialj apparently made a
tremendous impression on Nietzsche."

According

to Kaufmann, "many of the provocative ideas
he

[Aristotle]] expresses so unprovocatively and

dryly |in 4-.3J are fashioned into polemical ar
rows in Nietzsche's works, especially in
^Beyond Good 9*287.
original•

Emphasis is in the
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Zarathustra."

1

Kaufman undoubtedly has in mind

such intense exhortations as;
hope I beseech you;
in your soul!

"By my love and

do not throw away the hero

Hold holy your highest hope! ...

0?hu3 spoke Zarathustra."^

And;

"You shall al

ways be the first and excel all others;

your

jealous soul shall love no one, unless it be
the friend— that made the soul of the Greek
quiver;

thus he walked the path of his great

ness."^
Polemical arrows of a kind relevant
to a discussion of Aristotle's "megalopsychia"
also abound in Beyond Good and Evil, as when
Nietzsche declares;

"At the risk of displeasing

innocent ears I propose;

egoism belongs to

the nature of a noble soul."

And again when

he flings into the face of a Christian culture
the idea that "the feelings of devotion, selfsacrifice for one's neighbor, the whole morality
of self-denial must be questioned mercilessly and
^Nietzsche, pp. 382, 384-.
^Zarathustra 1.8
49.265.

%bid., 1.15-
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taken to court."
Nietzsche would have the noble soul question
the doctrine of grace as well.
The noble soul gives as it takes, from
that passionate and irritable instinct of
repayment that lies in its depth. The
concept "grace" has no meaning or good
odor inter pares [among equals}; there
may be a sublime way of letting presents
from above happen to one, as it were, and
to drink them up thirstily like drops—
but for this art and gesture the noble soul
has no aptitude. Its egoism hinders it:
quite generally it does not like to look
"up"— but either ahead, horizontally and
slowly, or down: 'It knows itself to. be at
sl height.2
But just as with Aquinas, Nietzsche's
kinship with Aristotle over megalopsychia breaks
down at a certain point.

We find, for example,

when we explore further the egoism of Nietzsche's
"noble soul," that it involves more taking than
giving.

In Nietzsche's view, the noble soul

possesses an
... unshakable faith that to a being such
as "we are" other beings must be subordinate
by nature and have to sacrifice themselves.
The noble soul accepts this fact of its
egoism without any question mark, also with^Zarathustra 2.$3p

Beyond Good 9*265.

original.

Emphasis is in the
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out any feeling that it might contain
hardness, constraint, or caprice, rather
as something that may be founded in the
primordial law of things:
if it sought
a name for this fact it would say, "it is
justice itself."1
For those bothered by the exploitation
that this passage sanctions, Nietzsche offers
this justification.

"'Exploitation' does not,"

he states, "belong to a corrupt or imperfect
and primitive society:

it belongs to the

essence of what lives, as a basic organic
function; it is a consequence of the will to
power, which is after all the will to life."

p

Here we start to move into Nietzsche's
metaphysics, and what we shall find is that,
although Nietzsche rejects Aquinas's doctrine of
grace, his metaphysics is every bit as determin
istic as Aquinas's.

For instance, when Nietzsche

accounts for the origin of the noble soul, one
of his formulations is:
The order of castes, the supreme, the
dominant law, is merely the sanction of a
natural order, a natural lawfulness of the
1Ibid.
^9-259. For Nietzsche's "will to power"
doctrine see Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp. 178-555•
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first rank, over which no arbitrariness,
no "modern idea" has any power. In every
healthy society there are three types which
condition each other and gravitate differently
physiologically; each has its own hygiene,
its own field of work, its own sense of per
fection and mastery. Nature .... disinguishea
the pre-eminently strong in muscle and
temperament, and those, the third type, who
excel neither in one respect nor in the other,
the mediocre ones— the last as the great
majority, the first as the elite.'
The members of this elite say of them
selves "Imperfection .... is beneath us.”

It

is not that they seek to rule over others or
to exploit them.

As Nietzsche puts it, "They

rule not because they want to but because they
are; they are not free to be second." -And their
exalted status "does not preclude their being the
most cheerful and the kindliest" of men.

p

Yet, any good they do, any virtue they
practice, is no more their own achievement
than for Aquinas's "predestined elect."
For every high world one must be born;
or to speak more clearly, one must be cultiv
ated for it: a right to philosophy— talking
that word in its great sense— one has only by
a

The Antichrist, sect. 57* As Kaufmann
observes in"his Nietzsche, p. 596 n. 8, Plato
"exerted a decisive influence on Nietzsche's
thought."

2Ibid.
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virtue of one's origins; one's ancestors,
one's "blood" decide here, too. Many
gererations must have labored to prepare
the origin of the philosopher; every one
of his virtues must have been acquired, nur
tured, inherited, and digested singly,
and not only the bold, light, delicate gain
and course of his thoughts but above all
the readiness for great responsibilities,
the loftiness of glances that dominate and
look down, feeling separated from the crowd
and its duties and virtues, the affable.
protection and defense of whatever is
misunderstood and slandered, whether it be
god or devil, the pleasure and exercise of
the great justice, the art of command, the
width of the will, the slow eye that rarely
admires, rarely looks up, rarely loves— '
Nietzsche's view of human nature is as
intensely deterministic as Aquinas's.

All one

has to do is replace Aquinas's "divine grace"
with Nietzsche's "origins, ancestors and blood."
"It is simply not possible," states Nietzsche,
"that a human being should not have the qualities
and preferences of his parents and ancestors
in his body, whatever appearances may suggest
o
to the contrary."
Can there be such a phenomenon, then,
as moral nobility, as envisioned by Aristotle?
Nietzsche answers:

"There is only nobility by

birth and blood .... Y/here there is talk of
^Beyond Good 6.213

2Ibid., 9.264.
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'aristocrats of the spirit', there is usually
no lack of reasons for keeping something secret
For spirit alone does not make noble, rather
something is required jto make noble the spirit»
What is required?

BloodHere

"blood”

operates for Nietzsche the way "grace" does for
Aquinas.

For Aquinas, free will moves man to

choose God's path, but it is God's grace that
moves this "free" will.

For Nietzsche, spirit

moves the noble man, but it is blood that moves
the spirit.
Both Aquinas and Nietzsche understand
Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia in
theory, but disagree with Aristotle over what
is needed for the embodiment of that conception
in an actual person.

Aquinas produces a

metaphysics in which any good a man performs,
any excellence he achieves, is, ultimately,
a result of God's grace.

He speaks of free

will but it turns out to be a will exercised as
a result of grace.

Thus, a man's worth is no

^The Will to Power sect. 9^2.
by Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 505*

Cited

longer a product of his own moral achievement.
Where Aristotle says the megalopsychos "thinks
himself worthy of great things, being worthy of
them," Aquinas says megalopsychia "makes a
man esteem himself worthy of great things through
contemplating the gifts he has from God."
The profound difference between Aristotle
and Aquinas is further reflected in Aquinas's
attempt to reconcile megalopsychia and humility.
His attempt is clever, and even successful,
so long as he limits the meaning of humility to
the withdrawing of "the mind from the inordinate
desire of great things against presumption.1’
Here he presents humility as a proper self
estimate, and hence a necessary safeguard
against hubris.

But when Aquinas is not at

tempting to reconcile humility and megalopsychia,
he reveals what he takes to be the chief meaning
of humility:

self-abasement.

As such, humility

stands in profound opposition to megalopsychia;
it is the very characteristic that Aristotle
identifies with micropsychia.
In contrast to Aquinas, one of the
leitmotifs of Nietzsche's opposition to
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Christianity is his contempt for humility.

As

he correctly observes, it is a contempt that
any Greek would share:
The Chinese have a proverb that mothers
even teach children:
siao-sin— "make your
heart small! This is the characteristic
fundamental propensity in late civilizations:
I do-not doubt that an ancient Greek would
recognize in us Europeans of- today, too, such
self-diminution; this alone would suffice
for us to "offend his taste . "— *
Thus, we do not find Nietzsche's noble
man attempting smallness of soul, as did
Aquinas's .

Rather he adopts the other vice

Aristotle opposes to megalopsychia:
inflation.

self

For Nietzsche the noble soul "knows

itself .to be at a height," has an unshakable
faith that to a being such as he is "other
beings must be subordinate and ... sacrifice
themselves," and says that imperfection is
beneath him.

Even apart from Nietzsche's

metaphysics these passages clearly smack of
what Aristotle would call self-inflation.

When

considered in light of Nietzsche's view that
the person they laud is a product— not of his
own efforts— but of a "natural order," and of
^Beyond Good 9*267*
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"ancestors** and of "blood,” then they begin to
q
border on blatant pomposity.
Both Aquinas and Nietzsche grasped the
meaning and spirit of

but elaborated and

embellished it, each in his own way.

In so do

ing, each of them abandoned the mean struck by
he who "thinks himself worthy of great things,
being worthy of them."

Each was pushed away from

this mean by a metaphysics and view of human
nature profoundly opposed to Aristotle's.

One

ended up advocating self-inflation, the other
micropsychia.

One advocated a caste of superior

beings sanctioned by the natural order of things,
the other an elite corp of predestined elect
also sanctioned by the natural order of things.
Both altered Aristotle's vision of a moral elite,
of what Nietzsche refers to with derision as
Nietzsche himself was guilty of this,
most clearly in Ecce Homo. As Kaufmann ob
serves in his Nietzsche, p. 117: "To be sure,
in Ecce Homo Nietzsche attempts what might be
called a deliberate self-mythologization;
some of his statements obviously make no claim
to literal correctness; and poetic license is
in places extended beyond all boundaries of
reason and good taste."

r
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an "aristocracy of the spirit.1'

Nietzsche is not alone in finding this
conception offensive.

By its very nature,

Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia sets
up a standard for the few.

This brings us to

the third reason for its negligible influence
in later ethical thinking.
"It is hard to be truly megalopsychos,"
Aristotle'admits, "for it is impossible without
kalokagathia."

It thus stands as a reproach to

those who do riot measure up to its demands.
Sometimes they will sink to calling that good an
evil.

One recent philosopher alludes to this

phenomenon as follows:
Pride is immanent in the prance of health
and of intelligence, as in the employment
of any talent or skill. More, the exercise
of a natural faculty can be censured as a
piece of insolence: the mere enjoyment of
the body or the mind takes you across the
limits of what someone, rightly or wrongly,
considers your proper sphere. To kick up
your heels in exuberance is to fling sand
in somebody's eyes. To wear bright clothes
in the vicinity of a funeral is to offend
the mourners— -who may resent the very ex
istence of a healthy person as an insult
to the dead .... Living is an affirmation
and can be taken as an affront . ‘
'i

Arnold Isenberg, "Natural Pride and
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An even more explicit description of this
phenomenon is found in Nietzsche, despite his
derision of "an aristocracy of the spirit.”

His

horror that the good should be hated surfaces
repeatedly in his writings.

A typical statement

is this:
Your silent pride always runs counter to
their bad taste; they are jubilant if for
once you are modest enough to be vain ....
Before you they feel small, and their
baseness glimmers and glows in invisible
revenge .... Indeed, my friend, you are the
bad conscience of your neighbors: • for they
are \mworthy of you. They hate you, there
fore , and would like to suck your blood ....
Flee, my friend, into your solitude and
where the air is raw and strong! It is not
your lot to shoo flies.1
These are strong statements; some will
call them overstatements.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche

puts his finger on an actual fact:

there exists

a class of people who, when they encounter a
noble individual, experience him as a reproach.
And some of these people will call him evil.
Nietzsche warns against them:
"You still feel noble, and the others
too feel your nobility, though they bear
Natural Shame,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research (September ”1 ^ 9 ) : ~T“2‘
'4-<,
^ Zarathustra 1.12.
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you a grudge and send you evil glances.
Know that the noble man stands in every
body’s way. The noble man stands in the way
of the good too: and even if they call
him one of the good, they thus want to do
away with him. The noble man wants to
create something new and a new virtue. The
good want the old, and that the old be pre
served.
"But by my love and hope I beseech
you: do no throw away the hero in your
soul! Hold holy your highest hope!"
Thus spoke Zarathustra.^
Nietzsche thus makes clear how 4 . 3 's
call for a moral elite stands as another reason
for its negligible influence in later ethics.
Despite his major divergences from Aristotle's
conception of megalopsychia, he superbly cap
tures , in certain passages, the spirit and the
meaning of Aristotle's "megalopsychia."

Today's conception of "magnanimity"
has a far narrower meaning.

Webster's Third

International Dictionary indicates two de
notations:

1) "a loftiness of spirit enabling

one to sustain danger and trouble with tran
quility, firmness, and courage," 2) "a nobility

A

Zarathustra 1.8. The applicability of
all this to the character of Socrates leaps to
mind.
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of feeling that is superior to meanness,
pettiness, or Jealousy and that disdains
revenge or retaliation:

generosity of mind."

Thus we see the influence of 4.5» tut without
the essence.

The action orientation is gone,

the concern with nobility of soul, and most of
the excellences that these imply.

It would seem

that Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia,
for all practical purposes* is lost.

It seems

that the misunderstandings, the fact that it
never had a true champion, and the fact that it
calls for a moral elite, have cast it into oblivion.
Recently, however, certain commentators
and translators, realizing that "magnanimity" no
longer carries the meaning of Aristotle's
"megalopsychia," have started to use other
expressions.

Ross in his Aristotle refers to

megalopsychia as "proper pride or self-respect,"

/i

and his translation of 4.5 renders it by "pride."
Rackham, in a note to his translation of 4.5,
observes that "megalopsychia" today means
"lofty pride and self-esteem rather than mag-

1P. 208.
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nanimity or high-mindedness (in the modern
/I

sense of the word).”

Ostwald, in a note to

his translation of 4-.3* prefers "high-mindedness”
because ”the connotations of megalopsychia
are much wider than the modern meaning of
'magnanimity', [and thus]'high-mindedness' seems
better suited to rendering the pride and conp

fident self-respect inherent in the concept.”
Edel in his Aristotle directly trans

lates megalopsychia as " p r i d e . S e d d o n in his
article refers to "Aristotle's image of the

great-souled man, the man of proper pride." 4Grant in his. commentary on 4-.3 states ithat
"loftiness of spirit is the highest form of
self-respect.”^
Thus, Aristotleps conception of megalo
psychia has been given a new lease on life.
Despite all the misunderstanding and bad press
and distortion, the self-respect inherent in
Loeb Classical Library, p. 213, note b.
p
Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1962), p. 92i n » 48.

^P. 137*

^"A Suggestion," p. 34.

^The Ethics of Aristotle, 2:72.
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Aristotle's "megalopsychia" is coming to be
recognized, quite correctly, as central and is
being designanted as such.
What is significant is that the megalopsychos is being viewed as possessing a positive
qualify:

self-respect.

This does not mean that

the above-cited commentators have given 4.3 an
unqualified endorsement.

Boss, for instance,

speaks of the "self-respect" of the megalopsychos
in one paragraph and in the next decries his
lack of "self-abasement before the ideal of
duty."

Undoubtedly, Eoss would feel more at

home with Aquinas's attempted reconciliation of
megalopsychia and humility.
Eoss's ambivalence is symptomatic of
the mixed attitude toward pride that prevails
today.

Although pride is generally no longer

regarded as an unmitigated evil, it. is usually
felt necessary to qualify pride, when recognized
as a positive, as proper pride.
Therefore, if Aristotle's conception
of megalopsychia is to have a future via the
concept of pride, two conditions must be ful-
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filled.

First, a certain consensus must "be

reached over the meaning of pride.
no such consensus today.

There is

Second, Aristotle's

conception of megalopsychia must be recognized
as capturing that meaning.

This means that a

certain consensus must also be reached over
the meaning of 4.3.

There is no such consensus

today.
Nevertheless, there exists a feeling
that pride is somehow a positive, human quality.
"Pride is immanent in the prance of health and
of intelligence."

And what does a sense of moral

health lead to, we can imagine Aristotle asking,
if not to a self-respectful pride?

Drawing a

positive perspective on pride, therefore, brings
out what seems to be its essential ingredient:
self-respect.

Herein lies the essence of

Aristotle's megalopsychos.

This is what the

above mentioned commentators seem to be glimpsing
in rendering megalopsychia by "proper pride," or
"self-respect.”
In doing so, however, they have raised a
number of complex philosophic issues.

For

1
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example:
If we conceive that pride can be, not
arrogance as compensation for uncertainty
[about one's sclf-valuej, but a quality of
honor and self-respect, we come closer to
a central, inescapable question: How can
an individual reach his full stature
without committing the sin of pride, at
tempting to reach beyond man’s limitations?
Or, conversely, how is it possible for an
individual to acknowledge the universe as
greater than himself and to humble himself
before it without denying self-respect and^
abasing himself as mean and insignificant?
Answers to such questions require clear
definitions of pride and humility.

If pride in

volves self-respect, and humility involves
self-abasement, then these two concepts are
antithetic. -The operative word is "if."

At

issue is the definer's view of the universe and
his view of human nature— complex issues each of them.
From the field of psychoanalysis we can
find a further issue well stated:
Freud assumes that both normal self
esteem and self-aggrandizement are nar
cissistic phenomena, the difference being
merely one of quantity. In my opinion this
failure to distinguish clearly between
the two attitudes toward the self befogs
the issue. The difference between self-
1

Helen Merrell Lynd, On Shame and the

108

esteem and self-inflation is not quanti
tative but qualitative. True self-esteem
rests on qualities which a person actually
possesses, while self-inflation implies
presenting to the self and to others
qualities or achievements for which there
is no adequate foundation. If the other
conditions are present, narcissistic trends
may arise if self-esteem and other qualities
pertaining to the individual's spontaneous
self are smothered. Hence self-esteem^and
self-inflation are mutually exclusive.
The issue here is epistemological.

How

does one know, as a practicing or aspiring
megalopsychos, that one is acting out of selfrespect, and not self-inflation?

Is the

^just-quoted author right in her diagnosis?

Is

the difference between self-respect and self
inflation one of quality, not quantity?

Are

self-respect and self-inflation really
essentially different, as she claims they are?
These are some of the issues that are raised
by the commentators who equate Aristotle's con
ception of megalopsychia with pride and selfSearch for Identity (New York:

srco.7

p. 254-•

1

Harcourt, Brace

Karen Horney, M.D. , New Ways in
Psychoanalysis (New Yorki ¥.177 Norton & Co.,
T939), p. 99.
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respect.
Ironically, philosophers themselves
have to some extent befogged these issues in
advance.

For instance, when we take the three

concepts of self-abasement, self-respect, and
self-inflation, and consider them in light of the
views of Aquinas and Nietzsche, the crucial
distinctions that Aristotle so clearly makes in
4-.3 become obscured.

For Aquinas, as we have

seen, the distinction between self-respect
(megalopsychia) and self-abasement is blurred.
For Nietzsche, the distinction between selfrespect and self-inflation is blurred.

Whether

or not Aquinas and Nietzsche are themselves
directly responsible for today's confusion over
these concepts, they are typical of the types
of philosophic influences that are at work.
Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia,
properly understood, along the lines of this in
quiry, has a very real role in clearing up
today's confusion.

It has been given a mandate

for this by those commentators who render it by
the concepts of pride and self-respect.

And
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it has received an inadvertent invitation for this
by the psychologist who so recently laments:
"We are as much in the dark as ever about the
origins of pride*"

This darkness might one

day be dispelled by Aristotle"s conception of
megalopsychia.

1

James C. Diggory, Self-Evaluation;
Concepts and Studies (New York: John Wiley
& S o n s , 1^69), p. 114.
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CHAPTER IV
MEGALOPSYCHIA AS SELF-RESPECT
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
In the foregoing chapters, I have
advanced an interpretation of Aristotle's
conception of megalopsychia radically different
from prevailing views.
The most persistent of these prevailing
views, I have indicated, regards Aristotle's
portrait of the megalopsychos in 4.3 as sketching
a man primarily concerned to receive externally
bestowed honor.

This, I have repeatedly insisted,

is a notion not only mistaken by itself, but
casts into a wrong light anything else that
one might say about the content of EN 4.3 and
its implications for Aristotle's ethical thinking.
In the first chapter of this study I
presented my interpretation of 4.3» and in the
second I outlined some of its implications for
Aristotle's general ethical thinking.

Then

in the chapter just completed I drew a historical
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perspective on megalopsychia and attempted to
account for its negligible influence in later
ethical thought.
My interpretation urges that, contrary
to surface appearances, the concern of Aristotle's
megalopsychos is basically to enhance the nobility
of his soul through a life of moral action.

That

is, the megalopsychos's concern is not with
external honor, honor externally bestowed by
his fellow man, but rather with his inner sense
of honor.

Aristotle's distinct achievement,

I have stressed, is that he has championed the
importance of proper pride or self-respect in
human existence and intimately linked it to
one's moral stature.
A few pages above, I indicated the wide
spread tendency of recent commentators to take
at least some cognizance of the element of selfrespect inherent in Aristotle's conception of
megalopsychia.

In this final chapter I want

to develop further implications of this for our
understanding of Aristotle's general ethics and,

1Pp. 103-106.
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to a lesser extent, for our understanding of
certain contemporary political thinkers.
*********************
I have already touched upon the fact
that in Aristotle's day an accepted conception
of megalopsychia did not exist.

As Gauthier

points out in Magnanimite^, technical terms of
philosophy are usually vague and subject to
fluctuation prior to the philosopher's definip
tion.
This was very much the case with megalopsychia in the 4th century B.C.

Gauthier

spells out four distinct significations that
existed then:

1) bearing an offense with com

posure, 2) great generosity or magnificence,
5) refusal to tolerate insult, and 4) impas
sibility before the vicissitudes of fortune.
The first of these, megalopsychia as the ability
to bear an offense with composure, we find in
Democritus, in the last years of the 5th century
and the first years of the 4th.

"Megalopsychia,"

^Above, pp. 43-44, 75-

p

In the next few paragraphs I shall be
drawing on Gauthier's lucid account of megalo
psychia in Greek culture before and during
Aristotle's time.

114

Democritus states, "consists in enduring tactlessness with composure."
The second signification, that megalo
psychia is great generosity, or magnificence,
we find in Demosthenes.

According to Gauthier,

Demosthenes thought that megalopsychia was "man
ifested in the splendor of a sumptuous reception
p
or welcome."
In Aristotle's time, Gauthier
continues, megalopsychia and megalopreueia were
used interchangeably.

For evidence he calls

our attention to Rhetoric 1.9 where the def
initions Aristotle gives of these two virtues
are "distinguishable only by barely perceptible
nuances."^
The third signification, megalopsychia as
1DK, fr. 46.
P
/
Hagnanimite, p. 19, nn. 1, 2, 3%agnanimite^, p. 20. This is not quite
so. The nuances are more than "barely per
ceptible." See 1366b 15-19. Nevertheless the
meanings do overlap:
"Megalopsychia is the vir
tue," Aristotle says, "that disposes us to do
good to others on a large scale." Magnificence
is a virtue "productive of greatness in matters
involving the spending of money." Gauthier also
cites the passage on megalopsychia in the Budemian
Ethics, 1232a 30-31» where Aristotle mentions the
resemblance of the megalopsychos and the mag
nificent man.
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the refusal to tolerate insult , and the fourth,
megalopsychia as impassibility before the
vicissitudes of fortune, we find cited by
Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics;
If we were inquiring what the essential nature
of megalopsychia i s , we should examine in
stances of men who are megalopsychos we know
of to see what, as such, they have in common;
such as if Alcibiades was megalopsychos,
or Achilles and Ajax were megalopsychos,
we should find on inquiring what they all
had in common, that it was intolerance of
insult; it was this which drove Alcibiades
to war, Achilles to wrath, and Ajax to
suicide. We should next examine other
cases, Lysander, for example, or Socrates,
and then if these have in common indifference
alike to good and ill fortune, I take these
two results and inquire what common element
have equanimity amid the vicissitudes of
life and -impatience of dishonor. If they
have none, there will be two genera of
megalopsychia.
Aristotle does not formulate here a definition to
cover both of these significations.

H e is simply

drawing on the word "megalopsychia1' to illustrate a problem in definition.

What is interesting is

that in mentioning characters from Homer,
Aristotle invites us, says Gauthier, to look to
the Iliad and Odyssey for the original use of the
concept megalopsychia.

12.13 97b 16-25.
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We find that, although Homer never used
the word ’'megalopsychia," he did use two words
nearly equivalent to it: ftC tictOvjk oS and
/

jl£%c(Al\Tcj(>.

Homer uses the first of these,

"m e g a t h y m o s for one example, to denote in the
Iliad Achilles's courage and valor in hattle.
This, Gauthier suggests, finds expression in
Aristotle's reference to megalopsychia as inv o l v m g refusal to tolerate an insult.
Homer uses "megaletor" in the Odyssey
to denote Ulysses’s ability to endure misfortune.
This, Gauthier points out, finds expression in
Aristotle’s reference to megalopsychia as in
volving impassibility before the vicissitudes of
2
fortune.
These four significations of megalo
psychia, then, clearly were current in Aristotle's
time.

Each of them, as we have seen in the

foregoing chapters, finds a place somewhere in
Aristotle's portrait of the megalopsychos in
4-.3«

Besides these significations, however,

many other elements of 4.3 can be discovered in
1

^

Magnanimite, p. 22.

P

Ibid., p. 39.
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Greek texts written between the time of Homer
and Aristotle.

These elements are presented

by various writers as qualities, not specifically
of a megalopsychos, but of the good man in general.
For example, we see such elements set forth by
Thucydides in his description of the quality of
wise moderation:
... thanks to its possession, we alone do
not become insolent in success and give
way less than others in misfortune; we
are not carried away by the pleasure of
hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which
our .judgment condemns; nor, if annoyed,
are we any the more convinced by attempts
to exasperate us by accusation. Ve are both
warlike and wise and it,,is our sense of
order that makes us so.
Such a passage clearly reminds us of
Aristotle's account of the megalopsychos.
is a man who "does not run into trifling
dangers, nor is he fond of danger, because he
honors few things.”

He "will be neither over

joyed by good fortune nor overpained by
'i
Speech of Archidamus in The History
of the Peloponnesian War, 1. 3* 84.'" Trans.
Richard Crawley, rev. R." Feetham in Great Books
of the Western World, Robert Haynard Hutchins,
ed. in' chief ’(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica,
1952).

^1124b 8.
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evil.

■1

Nor will he be like those who are dis

dainful and insolent because they have such goods
as power and wealth without having excellence of
character.^
Later in Thucydides's History we find more
excellences admired that will find expression
in Aristotle's account of megalopsychia.

In

Pericles's funeral oration, he speaks of the
qualities of the Athenian man as follows:

"In

generosity we are equally singular, acquiring
our friends by conferring, not by receiving,
favors .... And it is only the Athenians, who,
fearless of consequences, confer their benefits
not from calculations of expediency, but in the
confidence of liberality."^

Reading this, we

recall that one of the marks of Aristotle's
megalopsychos is "to ask for nothing or scarcely
anything, but to give help readily."^
In the same speech by ^e'ricles we are
again reminded of Aristotle's megalopsychos when
14.3 1124a 15.
52. 6. 43.

24.3 1124a 28.
44.3 1124b 18.
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we hear that "to a man of spirit, the degradation
of cowardice must "be immeasurably more grievous
than the unfelt death which strikes him in the
midst of his strength and patriotism.”

From

4.3 we already know that the megalopsychos will
face great dangers, and when he is in danger he
is unsparing of his life, knowing that there
are conditions on which life is not worth
•'I
having."
One of these conditions, Pericles
makes clear, would be to have to live with the
’'degradation of cowardice.”
Perhaps the most striking allusion to
that self-respect possessed by the man Aristotle
will later call megalopsychos is made- by the
Athenian stranger of Plato's Laws.
Wherefore I am right in bidding every one
to honor his own soul, which everyone seems
to honor, but no one honors as he ought;
for honor is a divine good, and no evil thing
is honorable; and he who thinks that he
can honor the soul by word or gift, or any
sort of compliance, without making her in
any way better, seems to honor her, but
honors her not at all .... for there is
nothing of earthly birth which is more
honorable than the heavenly, and he who
thinks otherwise of tie soul has no idea
how greatly he undervalues this wonderful

^1124b 8-9-
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possession.

1

Aside from Aristotle's conception of megalopsychia,
the expression "to honor one's own soul," I submit,
is the closest we will come to the concept of
self-respect in the Greek language.
What we need to realize in view of all
such references as the above is, first, that
p

Aristotle's great innovation, as I have indicated, ‘
was to take all these qualities admired by
Homer, Thucydides, Plato, and Greek thinkers
generally, and ascribe them to the megalopsychos.
Second, we need to realize, as I have also indic
ated, that the profound self-respect with which
Apistotle endows his megalopsychos, is not gained
by his receiving externally bestowed honor, but
by developing across his lifetime his inner sense
of honor through virtuous activity.
cannot be overstressed.

The latter

The expression "to

honor one's own soul," although the closest we
will come to the concept of self-respect in the
Greek language, has a meaning for Plato markedly
^727»
p

Trans. Benjamin Jowett.

Above, p. 77.
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different from Aristotle's meaning.

A little

later in his Laws Plato, again through the voice
of the Athenian stranger, continues:
Of all evils the greatest is one which
in the souls of most men is innate, and
which a man is always excusing in himself
and never correcting; I mean, what is ex
pressed in the saying that "Every man by
nature is and ought to be his own friend."
Whereas the excessive love of self is in
reality the source to each man of all of
fenses; for the lover is blinded about the
beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the
just, the good, and the honorable, and
thinks that he ought always to prefer him
self to the truth.^
We see in this passage conflicts to
which Aristotle's megalopsychos does not fall
victim.

Although he is a man who is indeed "his

own best friend," who takes "delight in his
p
achievements," and who knows "no regrets,"
he is a man passionately dedicated to the truth,
not least of all the truth about himself.

That

Aristotle grants to such a man the title
"megalopsychos," and does so because of his
earned, inner honor and not externally bestowed
honor is an act of great innovation and daring.
Even during Aristotle’s own lifetime, Isocrates

1731-732.

2Above, p. 36.
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describes megalopsychis in quite different terms.
He writes:

"Men of ambition and megalopsychia

not only are desirous of praise for such things
[as their great deedsj, but prefer a glorious
death to life, zealously seeking glory rather
than existence, and doing all that lies in their
power to leave behind a memory of themselves that
shall never die."

By sharp contrast, for the

megalopsychos of Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics "not even honor does he hold as being
p
the greatest thing."
In light of the above survey of
Aristotle’s predecessors and contemporaries
it is easy to see why Aristotle's conception
of megalopsychia might be regarded as no more
than a reassertion of, as Boss puts it, "the
qualities admired or disliked by cultivated
Greeks of Aristotle's time."^

Under the pre

vailing interpretation of 4.5, the megalo
psychos 's primary concern is to obtain external
a

Evagoras 9*3* Trans. LaRue Van Hook
in the Lo'eb Classical Library.
^Above, p. 28.

^Above, pp. 71-72.
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honor.

As Isocrates puts it, the megalopsychos

zealously seeks "glory rather than existence"
and does all that lies in his power to leave
behind a memory of himself "that shall never
die."

Clearly this is the megalopsychos of the

prevailing interpretation of 4.3.
Besides being mistaken in itself, this
interpretation fails to recognize the development
of Aristotle's thinking on megalopsychia
during the time that elapsed between the writing,
of the two versions of his ethics.

This de

velopment, I have pointed out, is most strikingly
manifested in the megalopsychos's attitude toward
honor.

The Budemian megalopsychos, who finds

his "greatest joy" in receiving honor, is the
megalopsychos of Isocrates.

However, the Nico

machean. megalopsychos is only "moderately pleased"
at the honor he receives and holds that not
even this honor is the "greatest thing."

The

contrast is exceedingly sharp.
The thesis that Aristotle's mature con
ception of megalopsychia involves a man whose
^Above, pp.

50- 52.
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basic concern is self-respect. and not the fame
or glory received from without, has a number of
further implications as well as the one just
treated.

As I have indicated in the previous

chapter, it firmly establishes that Aristotle
was indeed serious in his portrait of the megalo
psychos.

Now this is contrary to the thinking

of many scholars who think Aristotle is satirizing,
or in some other way being humorous about the
cultured, upper-class gentlemen of his day.

The

man in 4.3 , described in such detail by Aristotle,
could indeed come across as pompous and ridic
ulous were his basic concern really fame and
glory.

But once it is established that his

true concern is an earned self-respect, the por
trait must be seen in an entirely different
light.^
A further implication is that it cuts
the ground out from under a thinker such as
Gauthier.

Those of his persuasion all too

easily go from the premise that the megalopsychos's basic concern is great honor to the
^Above, pp. 71-74.

125

conclusion that he must therefore primarily
engage in that most honorable of human activ
ities:

theoria.

Gauthier, we have seen,

elaborates a meticulously detailed general
interpretation of Aristotle's ethics and intel
lectual development based on this starting
point.

His case was not entirely without

plausibility.

A

Yet, once establish that the

Nicomachean megalopsychos is not really con
cerned about external honor, and any temptation
to follow Gauthier in his attempt to fit the
texts to his starting assumption is gone.

The

motivation no longer exists.
This brings us to what I have stated is
a major implication of the thesis that Aristotle's
megalopsychos is primarily concerned with
self-respect and not external honor.
precisely this:

It is

it enables us to draw an en

tirely different perspective on Aristotle's
notorious bifurcation of human activity into the
moral and the theoretical.

As is well known.,

the problems inherent in this bifurcation have
^Above, pp. 4-1-4-4-.
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plagued scholars for centuries, not least of
which is the question of how much overlap would
Aristotle permit "between the two types of
activity when we look at an individual person.

'I

A typical statement is the following recent one:
A man must put his emotional and impulsive
life in order, so that in the ensuing calm
he may pursue his theorizing more readily;
but once this is accomplished there seems
to be no reason why he should prefer any
given moral claim— say that of defending
his friends' interests, expected even by
traditional standards of arete— to his
desire to philosophize.2
Now my position is that when we con
sider -the terms in which Aristotle couches his
3
bifurcation , < there can be no way of closing it
to the satisfaction of even a majority of
scholars.

One cannot, I would submit, expect

to bridge the gap produced by an invalid
dichotomy.

But the major implication of this

study's thesis for our understanding of Aristotle's
ethics as a whole, the different perspective
it provides us, is that the impossibility of

1

For my position on this question see
above, pp. 58-66, with my summary on pp. 65-66.
2
Arthur W. K„ Adkins, Merit and
Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960),
p. 546.

3

See, for example, p. 591 above.

Aristotle,
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satisfactorily bridging the gap really d.oes not
matter.

Consider the situation faced, by scholars

who accept the prevailing interpretation of
4-.3-

In the Hjcomachean Ethics we have two

types of life described:

the theoretical life*

"useless” because it does not advance "human
goods,"

and the moral life, crowned by a virtue

that involves, basically, concern with fame or
glory.

The ill repute which the latter has

enjoyed has been thoroughly documented in the
2
foregoing.
If, however, the basic concern of the
megalopsychos is to enhance the nobility of his
soul through a life of moral action, and not
simply to glorify himself in the eyes of others,
then, I would insist, the moral side of
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics should assume a
far greater importance than it has hitherto en
joyed.

In fact, I would urge that it is the

moral life described by Aristotle, as idealized
in the passage I there cite, clearly concedes
Adkins's point.
^Above, p. 59.

^Pp. 5-8, 69®
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and concretized in the person of the megalo
psychos , that deserves the greatest amount of
attention.

The greatest achievement of

Aristotle's ethics is that he championed selfrespect and made real the meaning of moral en
thusiasm.

It is herein, as I shall later point

out, that lies the greatest relevance of Aristotle's
ethics to modern thought.

But first there are

further implications of this result for our
understanding of Aristotle's ethical thinking.

At a number of points in the above chap
ters I have argued for the independent status of
megalopsychia as a virtue against those commentators who would deny to it that status.

More

might be said on this question, however, this
time from the standpoint of megalopsychia's
relationship to Aristotle's general theory of
virtue.

How well does megalopsychia fit into

this theory?
Aristotle defines virtue as ''a state of
character concerned with choice, lying in a mean,

1Pp. 11-13, 36-39, 79-81.
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that is, the mean relative to us, this being
determined by a rational principle, and by that
principle by which the man of practical wisdom
would determine it.”

Stating this more con

cisely, moral virtue is a state of character dis
posing us to choose, with the aid of nhronesis,
the mean relative to us in action or in emotion.
We can readily see that megalopsychia,
3ust as any of the other moral virtues, is sub
sumed by this definition.

While the self-inflated

man pursues great courses of action to which he
does not measure up, or simply pretends to be
worthy of such action, and the micropsychos
fails to pursue those great courses to which
he could measure up, the megalopsychos, by con
trast, chooses the mean between the self-inflated
and the microosychos, namely, those great actions
that correspond to his worth.
However, aside from this, there are pro
nounced differences between megalopsychia and the
other moral virtues.

One of the obvious points

of difference is that megalopsychia is the only

1EN 2.6 1107a 1-3.
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virtue tliat involves a self-estimate.

As we

know, the megalopsychos “thinks himself worthy
of great things, being worthy of them."

We

also know that megalopsychia involves practicing
and continuing to practice all the moral virtues;
that it involves the megalopsychos in a .selfestimate is underscored by the fact that the
"thinks himself worthy" statement requires that
he apply three other virtues to himself.

For

instance, the megalopsychos applies the virtue of
particular justice to himself,

claiming what is

"in accordance with his merits."

And since, as

Aristotle says, there is no honor from others
p
"that is worthy of perfect virtue," it becomes
all the more necessary, if justice is to be done,
for the megalopsychos to make real to himself,
through his own power of self-reflection, the
sense of honor which should be his for his practice
of all the other excellences.
Thus, the megalopsychos is also in
volved in applying the virtue of friendliness to

^Above, pp. 22-23.

24.5 1124a 8.

*\y\

himself.

Friendliness means rendering to each

person or class of people what is befitting,
and, as we have seen, the megalopsychos is a
a good man, and, again through his power of
self-reflection, will be "his own best friend."
Finally, all this clearly involves the
megalopsychos in applying the virtue of truthful
ness to himself.

In applying the virtues of justice

and friendliness to himself and arriving at
the awareness that he deserves great things, he
is merely "owning to what he has, and neither more
nor less."

This is how Aristotle has characterp

ized truthfulness.”

Therefore the fact that

megalopsychia involves a self-estimate, and does
so on three counts, makes clear one way in which
it differs from the other moral virtues.Another point of difference between
megalopsychia and the other moral virtues is
the fact that Aristotle describes the virtue of
megalonsychia exclusively in terms of the prac
titioner of the virtue, the megalopsychos.

In

deed, one of Aristotle's opening remarks in 4.3

^Above, pp. 20, 36.

^Above, p. 22.
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is that ”it makes no difference whether we con
sider the state of character or the man
characterized by it.”

The point here is not

that Aristotle did not describe, say, the
courageous man rather than courage itself.
fact he did.

In

The point is rather that for no

virtue is this approach so sustained as it is in
4-.3— so much so that Aristotle feels constrained
to remark on it.

We might ask, then, why Aristotle

adopts this approach.
We can observe first of all that the
approach is quite natural.

If we look to EN 3*6,

we find that'Aristotle easily passes back and
forth between descriptions of the virtue courage
and descriptions of the courageous man.

In

fact, so easily does he do this that it does
not even attract our attention.

The reason why

it is so natural to do this is obviously be
cause moral virtue so intimately involves action.
Moral virtue, we know, is a state of character,
but one that disposes us to choose the mean in
action or in emotion.
Aside from this, however, it is not
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inappropriate to see Aristotle's emphasis in 4.3
on a man in action as a conscious rhetorical
device on his part.

From a literary standpoint,

a word portrait has greater and more colorful
impact by depicting the man in action.

To ab-

stract the virtue away from the man practicing
it, is dry by contrast.
However, perhaps Aristotle's literary
style in 4.3 signals a more interesting fact.
Could it be that the style he adopts is a result
of the fact that he had a definite person in
mind as a model megalopsychos?
this to be the case.

Adkins believes

"That such men exist," he

says of Aristotle's megalopsychos, "is evident
from the manner in which they are spoken of."
Another commentator draws a different conclusion.
"Probably Aristotle traced different manif
estations of the great-souled element in different people," he says, "and ... combined them."
Others prefer to think that Aristotle had a
single concrete in mind, such as Alexander the
Merit and Responsibility, p. 353^Grant, Ethics of^Aristotle. 1:72.

p
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Great^ or Achilles.^
Others, still, do not believe that
Aristotle intends to portray a real man in 4.3 .
For one example:
It is impossible to determine how far
Aristotle was guided in his delineation of
the megalopsychos by reference to particular
individuals known to him. There certainly
seem to be touches in the work suggested
by such a reference; but it may be said, I
think, that the work loses, rather than gains,
by these attempts at realism, and that the
impression which they convey, that we have
before us a real and possible man, who, as
described, would be intolerable, is un
fortunate, and has contributed to the mis
understanding of the significance of megalo
psychia in Aristotle's Ethical System.
The measured movements, and the deep voice,
make us think of a real man: but, after
all, they are only i;he buskins and mask of
an ideal character.-•>
I think, however, that on this point the
following is closer to the truth:
I do not believe that Aristotle could
have written what may be termed an "im
possible dream" type ethical system— in’
this respect he remains eminently practical
and deserves the appellation "empiricist,"
although, even in this limited context, the
word must be quarantined by a quoting device.
One has only to peruse his examination of the
According to Stewart, Notes 1:336, this
was Hegel's view.
^Jaeger, Paideia, 1:420, n. 24.
^Stewart, Notes, 1:335-336.
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Platonic theory of the Good where he says
" ... clearly it could not be achieved by
man; but we are now seeking something
attainable." (1096b 33-4-) Nor have I been
able to locate any passage where, after de
tailing a particular virtue, Aristotle pro
claims it to be unattainable. This whole
^
motif is Christian rather than Aristotelian.
The question remains, then, did Aristotle
have a definite person in mind when he wrote
4-.3 .

A plausible case can be made for the

candidacy of Socrates as the following brings out:
... There are numerous features in the Nicomachean delineation of the megalopsychos
which are reminiscent of the traditional
picture of Socrates. He is indifferent to
fortune (1124a 13-16); he is aware of his
own deserts (Socrates— PI., Apol. 36b-e—
claimed he deserved to be feasted at the
public expense); he was indifferent to
danger, and did not think his life a thing
to be preserved at all costs (b 6-9);
he was not deferential to benefactors (cf.
his attitude to Archelaus, Rhet. II,
1398a 24), nor was he deferential to the
celebrated .... He was given to out
spokenness, though at the same time well
known for his irony .... One may add that
the picture in Plato's Symposium (220221) of Socrates at the battle of Delium is
consonant with 1123b 31* Socrates was, above
all, the classic exemplar of the principles
of self knowledge and self-sufficiency.2
Seddon, "A Suggestion," p. 352
P. A. Rees, "'Magnanimity' in the
Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics," Symposium
Aristotelicum 21-29, (August 1969 )•
p. 242.
Por other thinkers on these points, Rees cites

136

There is no question of a correspondence
between character traits exemplified bySocrates and character traits exemplified by
Aristotle's megalopsychos.

Here vre can recall

Socrates's courthouse statement:

"I spend all

my time going about trying to persuade you,
young and old, to make your first and chief con
cern not for your bodies nor for your possessions,
but for the highest welfare of your souls."

a

On the basis of such traits as the
above, F. Seddon argues that Socrates is indeed
an exemplar of megalopsychia.

Furthermore, since

Aristotle himself embodies these same traits,
he sees 4.3 as a composite picture of Socrates
and Aristotle.

p

Seddon bolsters his case for

Aristotle's candidacy by reference to the end
.of the Sophistical Refutations where Aristotle,
on p. 241, n. 25, Th. Deman, Le temoignage
d'Aristotle sur operates (Paris’: n.p., 1942),
p. 55, and he cites on p. 242, n. 26, E. Wolff,
Plato's A-pologie (Berlin: n.p., 1929), esp.
pp. 49-51.
1Above, pp. 76-772
Seddon develops his case in "A Sug
gestion," pp. 32-36.
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summoning our appreciation and warm thanks
for his logical works, demonstrates that he
thinks himself worthy of great things.
I would add in support of this the fact
that 4.3 seems to have a personal ring to it, as
of a man introspecting.

The intimacy of such

details as being "open in his hate and in his
love," of being "unable to make his life re
volve round another, unless it be a friend; for
this is slavish," and so many others, strongly
suggests that Aristotle recognized himself as
an embodiment of megalopsychia.

2

Thus'we have a further implication of
the thesis that the megalopsychos's basic con
cern is to enhance his self-respect.

If the

contrasting view were true, that Aristotle's
megalopsychos is basically concerned with ex
ternal honor, then we might readily conclude that
Alexander the Great is indeed the person Aristotle
And is indeed worthy of them, Seddon
suggests, p. 36 of his article, when we consider
the magnitude of the achievement which.is
Aristotle's Organon.
?
Without, of course, any of the self
inflation that runs through Nietzsche's Ecce
.
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had in mind when he wrote 4.3.

If on the other

hand the thesis of this study is correct, then
it could not "be such men as Alexander that
ememplify Aristotle’s megalopsychos.

Rather is

it plausible that Socrates or Aristotle himself
stood as the model for the portrait sketch in 4.3.
This in turn suggests a further implic
ation.

If it is indeed men such as Socrates

and Aristotle who embody the megalopsychos of 4.3,
then they would have to stand as an embarassment to those commentators who see the megalo
psychos as "intolerable," a conceited badmannered "prig,11 a ’’strange incubus," enough to
make one "shudder."

.So far, then, I have outlined two
points of difference between megalopsychia and
the other moral virtues in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.

First, megalopsychia involves

a self-estimate that none of the other virtues
requires, and second, Aristotle presents megalo
psychia, the virtue, exclusively in terms of the
megalopsychos, the practitioner of the virtue.

Homo. See above, p. 99, n. 1.
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There exists, however, a far more
important difference between megalopsychia and
the other moral virtues.
difference in scope.

There is an extreme

Megalopsychia, as we have

seen, is manifested only through the achieving
and the continued practice of all the other
moral virtues.

In this respect, megalopsychia

is the same as phronesis.

"With the presence

of the one quality, -phronesis,ti Aristotle tells
us, "will be given all the virtues."

A

Thus both

megalopsychia and phronesis involve the whole
moral life.

While all the other moral virtues

are specific., megalopsychia and phronesis might,
for the sake of contrast, be regarded as general
virtues.
Considering megalopsychia and phronesis
by themselves, however, and the fact that they
embrace, each of them, the whole moral life, we
must note that they do so from different per
spectives .

This difference can be stated in

a number of ways.

Most obviously, they have

different functions.

Phronesis provides the

1ER 6.15 1145a 1-2.
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means to the other virtues, namely the faculty
of wisely choosing the intermediate between ex
tremes.

Without this faculty, virtue, in

Aristotle's view, is not possible; it is built
into his very definition of virtue.

Thus we can

note that phronesis is more fundamental than
megalopsychia since megalopsychia itself is not
possible without the exercise of phronesis.
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the
function of megalopsychia is equally if not more
important than phronesis.

Megalopsychia pro

vides the enthusiasm, by providing the reason,
the motivation, for practicisng all the other
excellences.

Megalopsychia upholds as one’s

highest moral value the nobility of one's own
soul, one's self-respect.

Megalopsychia and

phronesis, therefore, while coextensive, are not
identical.
This might be thought to raise a problem.
If, as was just said, megalopsychia provides the
motivation for practicing the other excellences,
and if megalopsychia is not possible without
these excellences, then how is it formed.
Aristotle no doubt would point out that the
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potential megalopsychos has to start somewhere.
One is not born megalopsychos.

And we know from

Aristotle's theory of moral responsibility,
the crucial element of which is his theory of
agency,

that in Aristotle's view a person makes

himself megalopsychos.

If one were to ask how

this takes place, then we can recall Aristotle's
observation that "not to know that it is from
the exercise of activities on particular objects
that states of character are produced is the
mark of a thoroughly senseless person."

This,

of course, does not mean that states of character,
whether megalonsychia or some other, are developed
all at once.

Aristotle tells us, for example,

that, concerning justice and the other virtues,
"we plainly say that people of a certain character
are so more or less, and act more or less in ac2
cordance with these virtues.'
Aristotle is
here pointing out that a person develops in
degrees or stages a disposition to act in a
^Above, pp. 14-16.
2EN 3.5 1114a 9-11.
5EN 10.3 1175a 18-20.

14-2

certain way until, after a period of time, it
becomes a second-nature way of acting.

There

is no reason for us to suppose that Aristotle
would not say this of megalopsychia as well.
fact, we have evidence that he does.

In

Although

he tells us in the Nicomachean Ethics that "he
who is worthy of little and thinks himself worthy
2
of little is temperate but not megalopsychos,"
he also tells us in the Eudemian Ethics that
the temperate man might become megalopsychos.
In children Aristotle believes that we
see the beginning of the virtuous life in their
sense of shame.

He defines shame as "a kind of

fear of dishonor," consequent on bad actions,
specifically voluntary bad actions.

Ll

' It is more

like a feeling than a state of character because
in a sense, as in fear of death, it is a bodily
condition.

As evidence, Aristotle points out

This, of course, is not meant as an
exhaustive account of Aristotle's position on the
development of virtue. It omits, for instance,
the role of education and the role of pleasure.
However, it does highlight what I take to be
certain key elements.
21123b 6 .

51233a 23.

4-.9 1128b 12, 22, 28.

that just as people who fear death turn pale,
so do those who feel disgraced hlush.

However,

the key point is that the sense of shame is not
becoming to every age, but only to youth.
Aristotle explains that young people, because
they live by feeling and therefore commit many
errors, need a sense of shame to restrain them,
while an older person would not be praised for
being prone to the sense of disgrace.

This is

because, as Aristotle puts it, "we think he
should not do anything that need cause this
sense.
What- we need to note here is that the
young person’s sense of shame is the beginning of
a sense of self-respect.

As Aristotle observes,

a child cannot be megalopsychos.^

Yet by his

sense of shame, his fear of dishonoring himself,
he possesses a precondition for the development
of megalopsychia as an adult.

It is only a pre

condition because a sense of shame, in Aristotle's
view, does not constitute a virtue.
^1128b 13-14.

As he em-

^1128b 19-20.

^See, for one example, EN 1.9 1100a 1-3»
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phasizes in 4.1 * it is more characteristic of
virtue "to do what is noble than not to do what
/I
is base."
As I have already pointed out, for
no man is this more the case than for the
megalopsychos
We might now ask a further question,
namely:

Why should a person aspire to megalo~

psychia as an adult?

Presumably Aristotle would

answer that we have three basic choices.

One

can live a shameless existence, marked by all
kinds of base acts,
soul.

thereby

dishonoring his

Clearly this path is not desirable.

One

can also, Aristotle has indicated, live a temperate
existence.

Such a person lives a life guided

by the desire to avoid base actions.

He does

not perform noble actions but neither does he
commit base ones.

Or, Aristotle believes, one

can live the excel],ent life, characterized by
the performance of noble actions.

This is the

type of life that \^ill lead to the title "megalo
psychos," the life that Aristotle would insist
that all men ought to seek, though he implies
1

Above, p. 39 •

2

Above, p. 67•
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few will achieve it.

*1

Why should one seek to attain it?
Precisely because, Aristotle's basic answer
would be, this is what it means to flourish
as a human being.

The shameless person, or

even the temperate person, has settled for less
than a fully human existence.

For Aristotle,

to live a full human existence is to flourish
fully.

By no one is this better demonstrated

than by the megalopsychos.
An error sometimes made is to think that
Aristotle means by "eudaimonia" some kind of
mental state'such as happiness, rather than the
. .
2
ongoing activity of flourishing. “ This makes it
impossible to appreciate the role of megalopsychia in Aristotle's ethics.

On this view,

^See above, pp. 100-102.
2
See, for one example, Ii. A. Prichard,
"The Meaning of ^TA^oA/in the Ethics of Aristotle,"
Philosonhy 10 (January 1935)- Reprinted in
J. M. E» Moravcsik, ed., Aristotle: A Collection
of Critical Essays (University of Notre Dame
Press, 1967), pp. 241-260. Prichard admits
quite openly, pp. 259-260, that he thinks
Aristotle a psychological hedonist who holds
that all deliberate (as distinct from impulsive)
human acts, ultimately, are motivated by the
desire to become happy.
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megalopsychia is simply another virtue practiced
in order to reach the ultimate state of happiness,
^hus it fails to realize that megalopsychia. as
Aristotle's moral ideal, is the basic ingredient
of the ongoing activity of moral flourishing.
As I have demonstrated, one does not achieve
megalonsychia and then sit back and rest on one's
laurels.

Megalopsychia is intensely action

oriented.

It not only requires the achievement

of all the other moral excellences, it demands
their continued practice.

And this continued

practice of all the moral virtues is precisely
what Aristotle regards as full moral flourishing
as a human being.
The implication of the thesis that
megalopsychia is self-respect is that, for
Aristotle, one cannot fully flourish as a human
being without self-respect.

One's inner sense

of honor, one's self-respect, therefore,
represents in Aristotle’s eyes a primary human
good.

Without it one does not fully function

as a human being.
A major source of resistance to Aristotle's

conception of megalopsychia, however one in
terprets 4.3, is that it involves an intense
selfishness.

For the prevailing interpretation

this is of course manifest.

What could be more

selfish than to have as a basic concern re
ceiving honor from one's fellow man?

And is

not this one mark of an excessively proud in
dividual?
The interpretation I have set forth,
while markedly different from the prevailing
view, retains the megalopsychos1s selfishness.
To be concerned with the nobility of one’s soul
via concern with one's moral goodness, while
clearly more laudable than obsession with ex
ternal honor, is no less selfish.

After all,

the megalopsychos is "his own best friend"
and loves "himself best."

He dares to take

"delight in his achievements" and knows "no
regrets."

As we have seen, such traits have

displeased more than one commentator.

Further

more, all are marks of the man of pride and
pride has long been held in varying degrees of
disrepute.
We find a forceful statement of this in
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Rousseau.

He writes:

Pride must not "be confused with selflove: for they differ both in themselves
and in their effects. Self-love is a natural
feeling which leads every animal to look
to its own preservation, and which, guided
in man by reason and modified by compassion,
creates humanity and virtue. Pride is a
purely relative and factitious feeling, which
arises in the state of society, leads each
individual to make more of himself than
of any other, causes all the mutual damage
men inflict one on another, and is the real
source of the "sense of honor."'
Por Rousseau, as we can see, pride is
synonymous with self-inflation.

What is inter

esting is that he advocates self-love, if
properly understood.

But Rousseau was followed

by Nietzsche, in whom self-love takes on a
radically different meaning.

Nietzsche im

plicitly equates selfish egoism with arrogant
superiority.

His "noble" egoist has an "un

shakable faith" that "other beings must be
subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice
themselves."

He is a person whose will to life

sanctions the exploitation of lesser beings
p
for his own ends.
In light of thinkers such

'i

A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality,
trans. G. D. H. 'dole, n.~"2~to the "Pirst Part in
Great Books of the Western World.

2Above, pp. 92-93.
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as Nietzsche, the cultural bias against self
ishness, and the concept of a proper pride,
becomes understandable.
However, the issue of selfishness, of
proper pride, is more complex than this, as is
indicated by the following:
When a man is described as selfish what
is meant primarily is that he is moved to
act, more often and more strongly than most
men, by desires which are selfish. The word
'selfish' is also applied to a disposition
so to plan one's life as to give a larger
place than is usual or right to the gratif
ication of selfish desires. But what is
it for a desire to be selfish? Professor
Broad, in his essay 'Egoism as a theory of
human motives' (in Ethics and the History of
Philosophy), makes an important distinction
’between" two main kinds of 'self-regarding'
desires. There are first desires which are
'self-confined', which a man could have
even if he were alone in the world, e.g. de
sires for certain experiences, the desire
to preserve his own life, the desire to
feel respect for himself. Secondly there
are self-regarding desires which nevertheless
presuppose that a man is not alone in the
world, e.g. desires to own property, to
assert or display oneself, to inspire af
fection. Broad further points out that de
sires which are 'other-regarding' may also
be 'self-referential', e.g. desires for the
welfare of one's own family, friends, school,
college, club, nation ....
... Usually 'selfish' refers to the
prominence of self-regarding motives, and
different kinds of selfishness correspond to
different self-regarding desires. The word,
being pejorative, is more readily applied
to the less reputable of the self-regarding
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desires.^
This last sentence most clearly refers to
''selfishness" when used in connection with
Nietzsche.

But "selfishness" when used in con

nection with Aristotle's megalopsychos assumes an
entirely different meaning.

We need to observe,

in reference to the above quotation, that, indeed,
Aristotle's megalopsychos exhibits desires that
are "self-confined," that he would have even were
he alone in the world:

desire to "preserve his own

life," and "the desire to feel respect for him
self" (this most surely).

But we need also to

observe that, his desire for self-respect is, in
Aristotle's view, largely met by fulfilling those
other desires that presupnose a great concern for
his fellow man.

Thus he gives help readily,

even to the point of dying for country or friend
should that be required of him.
is clear:
Nietzsche.

Hardie's point

a man can be selfish without being a
The megalopsychos of 4.3 exemplifies

an Aristotelian selfishness or pride, and this,
we must conclude, is profoundly different from
^W. F. R. Hardie, "The Final Good in
Aristotle's Ethics," Philosophy 15 (1965). He-
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Niet zschean selfishness.

It is the "noble”

soul exemplifying Nietzschean selfishness that
should cause commentators to "shudder.”

The

same response should not be evoked by Aristotle's
megalopsychos, at least not if one understands
what he represents.
The selfishness inherent in Aristotle's
conception of megalopsychia or self-respect,
therefore, need give no cause for hesitation.
We can see, by contrasting Aristotle and
Nietzsche on the issue of selfishness, that,
as Hardie claims, there are indeed two types
of self-regarding desires.

It is to the

Aristotelian type that certain contemporary
thinkers are implicitly referring when they
advance self-respect as a primary human good.
it is to this modern regard for self-respect
and Aristotle's relevance to it that I wish
to devote the remaining pages of this study.
I*********************
The most vocal contemporary advocate of
printed in Moravcsik, ed„, Aristotle: A
Collection of Critical Essays, pp. £97-522.
For this citation, pp. 311-3^2.

And
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self-respect as a basic human good is without
question Rawls.

Writing in his well known

Theory of Justice he says:
... perhaps the most important primary good
is that of self-respect .... We may define
self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two
aspects. First of all, as we noted earlier,
it includes a person's sense:of his own
value, his secure conviction that his con
ception of his good, his plan of life, is
worth carrying out. And second, selfrespect implies a confidence in one's ability,
so far as it is within one's power, to ful
fill one's intentions. When we feel that
our plans are of little value, we cannot
pursue them with pleasure or take delight
in their execution.
Nor plagued by fail
ure and self-doubt can we continue in our
endeavors. It is clear then why self-respect
is a primary good. Without it nothing may
seem worth doing, or if some things have
value for u s , we lack the will to strive
for them. All desire and activity becomes
empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and
cynicism.^
There can be no doubt that Aristotle's
megalopsychos meets the two aspects of selfrespect Rawls sets forth.

To think himself

"worthy of great things, being worthy of them,"
this characterization alone, requires that the
megalopsychos have a real "sense of his own
value," and a confidence in his ability to fulJohn Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cam
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1971)» P* 44-0
(hereafter cited as Rawls, Justice).
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fill his intentions*

As we have seen, he is his

"own best friend," and "loves himself best,"
and is a man who "knows no regrets.”
As I have pointed out, self-respect, in
Aristotle's account, is a virtue extremely broad
in scope, so broad that I would classify it
a general virtue.

Again, on this, there is a

correspondence between Rawls's conception of
self-respect and Aristotle's.

This is il

lustrated by Rawls's statement that "self-respect
is not so much a part of any rational plan of
life as the sense that one's plan is worth carry•1
ing out."
Implicit here is Aristotle's mes
sage in 4.3 that self-respect gives to a person
that sense of worthiness that will lead him to
pursue other desired human qualities within
his "plan of life."
But the points of correspondence between
Aristotle and Rawls on the subject of selfrespect go no further than these.

When vie view

Rawls's conception in the philosophic framework
within which he writes, we can see profound
^Justice, p. 178*
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differences "between it and Aristotle's con
ception of megalopsychia.
As I have pointed out, Aristotle's
megalopsychos exhibits an intense, though
benevolent selfishness or pride.

This, I have

shown, rests upon his recognition of his moral
worth.

"He thinks himself worthy of great

things, being worthy of them," a clear-cut in
dication that the megalopsychos recognizes his
moral stature.

Now Eawls's self-respecting

man would have to be quite a different sort of
person.

"The idea of rewarding desert is im

practical," declares Rawls.

"And certainly to

the extent that the precept of need is emphasized,
moral worth is ignored .... we may assume that
everyone is of equal moral worth."

For Rawls

the notion of moral desert is irrelevant to the
issue of self-respect.

He writes:

The precept which seems intuitively to come
closest to rewarding moral desert is that
of distribution according to effort, or
perhaps better, conscientious effort ....
however, it seems clear that the effort a
person is willing to make is influenced
by his natural abilities and skills and
a

Justice, p. 512.
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the alternatives open to him. The better
endowed are more likely, other things equal,
to strive conscientiously, and there seems
to be no way to discount for their greater
good fortune.^
Rawls then, in extreme contrast to
Aristotle, divorces self-respect from one's
moral stature.

p

Where then, we need to ask,

does self-respect come from in Rawls's eyes?
Rawls's answer is that it comes from other
people— in two ways.

"A desirable feature of a

conception of justice,” he writes, "is that it
should publicly express men's respect for one
another.

In this way they insure a sense of

their own v a l u e . T h u s Rawls makes it clear
that our self-respect depends on the good opinion
of others.

As he elsewhere puts it, "our

self-respect normally depends upon the respect
^Justice, p. y \ 2 .
2
For Aristotle's account of moral responsibity, see above, pp. 14-16.
55

^Justice, p. 179- We see here how Rawls
connects the concept of self-respect and the sub
ject of his book, justice. What he says about
self-respect, however, stands or falls quite
independently of his conception of justice.
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of others."

1 And "unless our endeavors are

appreciated by our associates it is impossible
for us to maintain the conviction that they are
o
worthwhile."
Thus we see one way in which we
gain self-respect from others is simply by
being esteemed by them.
A second way, Rawls thinks, is by
receiving from them those objective goods, such
as opportunity, income, and the good things in
life generally, that will give us social stature.

x

As Rawls expresses this point, "a person's lesser
position as measured by the index of objective
primary goods may be so great as to wound his
self-respect."
Thus the split between self-respect and
one's moral stature is an extreme one for Rawls,
and it is precisely on this point, and its ram- •
ifications, that Aristotle's conception of
megalopsychia is relevant.
^Justice. p. 178.

Aristotle would want
%bid., p. 441.

^See pp. 510 and 3A5, among other places
in Justice.
4
Justice, p. 55^-
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to know, as would we, the following:

Even if

a person could gain self-respect by receiving
the esteem of others, on what grounds would
this esteem be granted, if moral stature is ir
relevant.

Rawls, we have seen, assumes, in

laying out the social conditions upon which selfrespect rests, "that everyone is of equal moral
worth."

Thus self-respect is not a function of

moral worth to Rawls.

After all, one program

of his theory of justice is to set forth the
social conditions that provide for the fair
distribution of the most important of primary
goods, self-respect.

And if self-respect were

a function of moral worth, such a distribution
would not even arise as a problem; if everyone
were of equal moral worth, then everyone would
have equal self-respect.
This of course is where those objective
goods, such as opportunity, income, and the
good things in life generally, come into play.
These, Rawls tells us, when deficient, will
wound one's self-respect.

^Above, p. 154.

Thus one person (or

158

society) can directly bolster another's selfrespect by imparting to him a greater share in
such goods.
Again, however, certain observations
Aristotle makes in connection with his con
ception of megalopsychia become relevant.

As

we have already see, Aristotle thinks it un
characteristic of the self-respecting man to seek
a sense of self-worth from external goods.
suggests that this would be an inversion.

He
As

he has so aptly stated it, man does not "acquire
or preserve virtue by the help of external goods,
1
but external goods by the help of virtue."
But more than this is Aristotle's further
observation— and again the sharpness of his
perception is impressive— that the mere pos
session of external goods, whether it be the
esteem of others, or those other goods cited
by Rawls, does not lead to self-respect anyway.
On the contrary, Aristotle points out in 4.3»
unaccompanied by virtue, they only make a person
p
"disdainful and insolent."
And these are marks—
1Above, p. 51.

^1124a 29.
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not of a self-respecting person— but of the
self-inflated person.
We might ask at this point why it is that
Eawls divorces self-respect from one's moral
stature.

Relevant to getting at an answer are

the following remarks concerning Rawls's account
of self-respect:
What strikes us immediately about this
account, especially if we have comparable
Greek views in mind, is its insistence on
the subjectivity of these phenomena. Shame
is a feeling or emotion, self-respect a
sense of worth, a feeling of capacity, an
inner conviction. According to this account,
apparently, a position that is not felt as
shameful is not so. And if you feel your
life-plan to be a worthy one, and feel con
fident that you can carry it out, that
appears sufficient to make you a person of
seif-respect. Rawls thus implicitly denies
that the objective (or intersubjective)
value of my pursuits and the truth of my
beliefs about them are at all relevant to
the issue of self-respect and shame . *
Here we have an explanation of Rawls's
Martha Nussbaum, "Shame, Separateness,
and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of
Plato," in A. Rorty, ed., Mind and the Good
(University of California Press, forthcoming).
Emphasis in the original. Nussbaum, a colleague
of Rawls at Harvard, reminds us in a note to the
above passage that "the bulk of Greek literature
.... ascribes great importance to the sense of
shame, attacks the vice of shamelessness, and
connects the avoidance of shame with excellence
of character and action in accordance with shared
norms•"

160

separation of self-respect from one's moral
stature.

The subjectivity of Rawls's account

of the value of a life plan explains the ease
with which he can assume that "everyone is of
equal moral worth.”

And for reasons already

given this makes moral stature irrelevant to
-t
self-respect.
This is where Aristotle's conception
of self-respect becomes most relevant to a
thinker such as Rawls.

Aristotle's conception

suggests that Rawls fails to distinguish
between a genuine self-respect and a mere
felt or pseudo-self-respect.

As he has em

phasized in 4-„3, men become disdainful and inso
lent when, without virtue, they have external
goods.

Aristotle does recognize that men pur

sue honor in order to be assured of their own
2
goodness.
But the whole implication of his
conception of megalopsychia is that it is only
a man who is not really good who will seek a
sense of self-worth by pursuing external honor.
In contrast is the emphasis of Aristotle's con
1

Above, p. 157.

P

See above, p. 30.
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ception of megalopsychia in 4-.3, that the basic
concern of the truly self-respecting man is
not great honor or, as Hawls expresses it,
respect from others.

Not even this, we have

seen Aristotle insist, is, for the self-respecting
person, the greatest of goods.
Nussbaum, in contrasting Rawls's notion
of self-respect with the general conception held
by Greek thinkers, remarks that in the Greek mind
self-respect ... appears to be closely
bound up with character, and with the ex
cellences of both character and intellect ....
The activities of the self-respecting man,
to be worthy rather than merely lucky,
must be chosen for good reasons, in awareness
of their-value ... self-respect seems, then
less like a feeling identified subjectively
then like a disposition to both act and feel
in certain appropriate ways . '
For no Greek thinker are these remarks
more true than for Aristotle.

His crucial con

tribution to any later theorizing concerning
self-respect is that he was the first to so
clearly distinguish self-inflation, self-respect,
and self-abasement, and connect self-respect
to one’s moral stature.

1

Unity:

He was the first to

"Shame, Separateness, and Political
Aristotle's Criticism of Plato."
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give us a detailed portrait of what a person
with genuine self-respect might be like.
For such a vision and for conveying it
to us in the vivid terms of a flourishing human
being, I submit, we owe Aristotle the same
tribute he sought at the end of another of his
works, our admiration and— our warm thanks.
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